In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the basic framework (...) of our PIF account of truth-talk, we demonstrate a few advantages it offers over T-deflationist accounts that do not explicitly acknowledge pretense at work in the discourse. In turning to the Liar Paradox, we explain how the quasi-anaphoric functioning that our account attributes to truth-talk provides a diagnosis of the Liar Paradox (and other instances of semantic pathology) as having no content—in the sense of not specifying any of what we call M-conditions. At the same time, however, we vindicate the intuition that we can understand liar sentences, thereby avoiding one standard objection to “meaningless strategy” responses to the Liar Paradox. With this diagnosis in place, we then, by way of treatment, introduce a new predicate, ‘semantically defective’, and show how the explanation we give for its application allows for a consistent, yet revenge-immune, (dis)solution of the Liar Paradox, and semantic pathology generally. (shrink)

Consider the following argument written on the board in room 227: 1 = 1. So, the argument on the board in room 227 is not valid. This argument generates a paradox. The aim of this paper is to present a resolution of this paradox and related paradoxes of validity, including a version of the Curry paradox. The proposal stresses the close connections between these validity paradoxes and paradoxes of truth and paradoxes of denotation. So a more general aim is to (...) provide a unified response to semantic paradox. The positive proposal is in part inspired by a brief, tantalizing suggestion of Gödel’s, that the paradoxes might appear “as something analogous to dividing by zero”—so that the concept of validity, for example, is everywhere applicable except for certain singular points or singularities. A second central claim is that ‘valid’ is a context-sensitive predicate. The key notions of this contextual-singularity theory are presented and applied to a variety of cases. Any purported solution to paradox must deal with the phenomenon of revenge, and a response to revenge is outlined. The paper closes with remarks about the accommodation of Tarski’s claim that natural languages are universal. (shrink)

A Curry paradox about truth is generated by the following sentence, written on the board in room 101:If the sentence on the board in room 101 is true then 1 ≠ 1.A Curry paradox about validity is generated by the following argument, written on the board in room 102:The argument on the board in room 102 is valid. Therefore, 1 ≠ 1.Though the sentence and the argument generate Curry paradoxes, they also generate more basic paradoxes, in a sense to be (...) made clear. I argue that if we solve these more basic paradoxes, we have solutions to both kinds of Curry paradox. The positive proposal is in part inspired by a brief remark of Gödel’s, that the paradoxes might appear “as something analogous to dividing by zero”—so that the concepts of truth and validity, for example, are everywhere applicable except for certain singular points or singularities. A second central claim is that 'true' and 'valid' are context-sensitive predicates. This contextual-singularity approach to the Curry paradoxes applies also to other paradoxes of truth, validity, denotation, and predicate-extension. So a more general aim of the paper is to provide a unified response to semantic paradox. (shrink)

In his Quadratura, Paul of Venice considers a sophism involving time and tense which appears to show that there is a valid inference which is also invalid. Consider this inference concerning some proposition A : A will signify only that everything true will be false, so A will be false. Call this inference B. A and B are the basis of an insoluble-that is, a Liar-like paradox. Like the sequence of statements in Yablo's paradox, B looks ahead to a moment (...) when A will be false, yet that moment may never come. In the Quadratura, Paul follows the solution to insolubles found in the collection of elementary treatises known as the Logica Oxoniensis, which posits an implicit assertion of its own truth in insolubles like B. However, in the treatise on insolubles in his Logica Magna, Paul develops and endorses a different solution that takes insolubles at face value. We consider how both types of solution apply to A and B : on both, B is valid. But on one, B has true premises and false conclusion, and contradictories can be false together; on the other (following the Logica Oxoniensis), the counterexample is rejected. (shrink)

Scholastic and analytic definitions of semantic paradoxes, in terms of groundlessness, circularity, and semantic pathology, are introduced and compared with each other. The fundamental intuitions used in these definitions are the concepts of being true about extralinguistic reality, of making statements about one’s self, and of compatibility with an underlying semantic theory. The three approaches—the groundlessness view, the circularity view, and the semantic pathology view—are shown to differ not only conceptually, but also in their applications. As both a means for (...) showing these differences and as an adequacytest, the so-called two-line puzzles are used, which allows one to address the possibility of making non-paradoxical statements about paradoxical sentences within the same language. (shrink)

In the 1330s Roger Swyneshed formulated a solution to semantic paradoxes based on the distinction between correspondence with reality and self-falsification as truth-making factors. Since Swyneshed states that some valid inferences are not truth-preserving, his view implies the question of the general definition of validity which he does not address explicitly. Logical works attributed to Paul of Venice contain developments of Swyneshed's contextualist semantics substantially modified by the assumption that sentential meanings are objective propositional entities. The main goals of this (...) paper are to show the correlations between the ontological and logical developments of Swyneshed's semantics in the works of Paul of Venice and to outline a context-sensitive formal semantics that could serve as a model of this family of semantic theories. (shrink)

Expanding on the recent research of Stephen Read and Catarina Dutilh Novaes concerning Thomas Bradwardine's theory of truth, the present paper makes an effort to analyse the Currian conditional in terms of the so-called ?Bradwardine principle?, i.e. the principle that meaning is closed under entailment. Based upon two possible applications of this approach, alternative solutions to the issues of semantic pathology and trivialisation of deductive systems are presented.