This paper discusses the question of stable facts in relational quantum mechanics (RQM). I examine how the approach to quantum logic in the consistent histories formalism can be used to clarify what infomation about a system can be shared between different observers. I suggest that the mathematical framework for Consistent Histories can and should be incorporated into RQM, whilst being clear on the interpretational differences between the two approaches. Finally I briefly discuss two related issues: the similarities and differences between (...) special relativity and RQM and the recent Cross-Perspectival Links modification to RQM. (shrink)

Choice can be defined in thermodynamical terms, and shown to have a thermodynamic cost: choosing between a binary alternative at temperature T dissipates an energy $$E\ge kT\ln 2$$.

We develop a mathematical formalism that allows to study decoherence with a great level generality, so as to make it appear as a geometrical phenomenon between reservoirs of dimensions. It enables us to give quantitative estimates of the level of decoherence induced by a purely random environment on a system according to their respectives sizes, and to exhibit some links with entanglement entropy.

We discuss a recent work by J. Lawrence et al. [arxiv.org/abs/2208.11793] criticizing relational quantum mechanics (RQM) and based on a famous nonlocality theorem Going back to Greenberger Horne and Zeilinger (GHZ). Here, we show that the claims presented in this recent work are unjustified and we debunk the analysis.

Lawrence et al. have presented an argument purporting to show that “relative facts do not exist” and, consequently, “Relational Quantum Mechanics is incompatible with quantum mechanics”. The argument is based on a GHZ-like contradiction between constraints satisfied by measurement outcomes in an extended Wigner’s friend scenario. Here we present a strengthened version of the argument, and show why, contrary to the claim by Lawrence et al., these arguments do not contradict the consistency of a theory of relative facts. Rather, considering (...) this argument helps clarify how one should not think about a theory of relative facts, like RQM. (shrink)

In 1927 Louis de Broglie proposed an alternative approach to standard quantum mechanics known as the double solution program (DSP) where particles are represented as bunched fields or solitons guided by a base (weaker) wave. DSP evolved as the famous de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave interpretation (PWI) also known as Bohmian mechanics but the general idea to use solitons guided by a base wave to reproduce the dynamics of the PWI was abandoned. Here we propose a nonlinear scalar field theory able (...) to reproduce the PWI for the Schrödinger and Klein–Gordon guiding waves. Our model relies on a relativistic ‘phase harmony’ condition locking the phases of the solitonic particle and the guiding wave. We also discuss an extension of the theory for the N particles cases in presence of entanglement and external (classical) electromagnectic fields. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the preferred basis problem in relational quantum mechanics (RQM). The issue is at the heart of quantum mechanics and we first show that the mathematical formalism of RQM is immune to recent critics concerning consistency. Moreover, we also analyse the notion of interaction in RQM and provide a for all practical purposes reading of RQM comparing it with Bohmian mechanics.

The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) has received a growing interest since its first formulation in 1996. Usually presented as an interpretational layer over the usual quantum mechanics formalism, it appears as a philosophical perspective without proper mathematical counterparts. This state of affairs has direct consequences on the scientific debate on RQM which still suffers from misunderstandings and imprecise statements. In an attempt to clarify those debates, the present paper proposes a radical reformulation of the mathematical framework of quantum (...) mechanics which is relational from the start: fact-nets. The core idea is that all statements about the world, facts, are binary entities involving two systems that can be symmetrically thought of as observed and observer. We initiate a study of the fact-nets formalism and outline how it can shed new relational light on some familiar quantum features. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

In this paper, we evaluate some proposals that can be advanced to clarify the ontological consequences of Relational Quantum Mechanics. We first focus on priority monism and ontic structural realism and argue that these views are not suitable for providing an ontological interpretation of the theory. Then, we discuss an alternative interpretation that we regard as more promising, based on so-called ‘metaphysical coherentism’, which we also connect to the idea of an event-based, or ‘flash’, ontology.

The paper investigates the type of realism that best suits the framework of decoherence taken at face value without postulating a plurality of worlds, or additional hidden variables, or non-unitary dynamical mechanisms. It is argued that this reading of decoherence leads to an extremely radical type of perspectival realism, especially when cosmological decoherence is considered.

Relational Quantum Mechanics is an interpretation of quantum theory based on the idea of abolishing the notion of absolute states of systems, in favor of states of systems relative to other systems. Such a move is claimed to solve the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, RQM has been argued to account for all quantum correlations without invoking non-local effects and, in spite of embracing a fully relational stance, to successfully explain how different observers exchange information. In this work, (...) we carry out a thorough assessment of RQM and its purported achievements. We find that it fails to address the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics—related to the lack of clarity in its ontology and the rules that govern its behavior—and that it leads to serious conceptual problems of its own. We also uncover as unwarranted the claims that RQM can correctly explain information exchange among observers, and that it accommodates all quantum correlations without invoking non-local influences. We conclude that RQM is unsuccessful in its attempt to provide a satisfactory understanding of the quantum world. (shrink)

In this paper, we evaluate some proposals that have been put forward to clarify the ontological consequences of relational quantum mechanics. We first focus on priority monism and ontic structural realism and argue that these views are not suitable for providing an ontological interpretation of the theory. Then, we discuss an alternative interpretation that we regard as more promising, based on so-called ‘metaphysical coherentism’, which we also connect to the idea of an event-based, or ‘flash’, ontology.

The subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics and Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics are both notable for embracing the radical idea that measurement outcomes correspond to events whose occurrence is relative to an observer. Here we provide a detailed study of their similarities and especially their differences.

The Quantum Measurement Problem is arguably one of the most debated issues in the philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, since it represents not only a technical difficulty for the standard formulation of the theory, but also a source of interpretational disputes concerning the meaning of the quantum postulates. Another conundrum intimately connected with the QMP is the Wigner friend paradox, a thought experiment underlining the incoherence between the two dynamical laws governing the behavior of quantum systems, i.e the Schrödinger equation and (...) the projection rule. Thus, every alternative interpretation aiming to be considered a sound formulation of QM must provide an explanation to these puzzles associated with quantum measurements. It is the aim of the present essay to discuss them in the context of Relational Quantum Mechanics. In fact, it is shown here how this interpretative framework dissolves the QMP. More precisely, two variants of this issue are considered: on the one hand, I focus on the “the problem of outcomes” contained in Maudlin (1995)—in which the projection postulate is not mentioned—on the other hand, I take into account Rovelli’s reformulation of this problem proposed in Rovelli (2022), where the tension between the Schrödinger equation and the stochastic nature of the collapse rule is explicitly considered. Moreover, the relational explanation to the Wigner’s friend paradox is reviewed, taking also into account some interesting objections contra Rovelli’s theory contained in Laudisa (2019). I contend that answering these critical remarks leads to an improvement of our understanding of RQM. Finally, a possible objection against the relational solution to the QMP is presented and addressed. (shrink)

The traditional analysis of the basic version of the double-slit experiment leads to the conclusion that wave-particle duality is a fundamental fact of nature. However, such a conclusion means to imply that we are not only required to have two contradictory pictures of reality but also compelled to abandon the objectiveness of the truth values, “true” and “false”. Yet, even if we could accept wave-like behavior of quantum particles as the best explanation for the build-up of an interference pattern in (...) the double-slit experiment, without the objectivity of the truth values we would never have certainty regarding any statement about the world. The present paper discusses ways to reconcile the correct description of the double-slit experiment with the objectiveness of “true” and “false”. (shrink)

We propose a model of physics that blends Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics (RQM) interpretation with the language of finite information quantities (FIQs), defined by Gisin and Del Santo in the spirit of intuitionistic mathematics. We discuss deficiencies of using real numbers to model physical systems in general, and particularly under the RQM interpretation. With this motivation for an alternative mathematical language, we propose the use of FIQs to model the world under the RQM interpretation, wherein we view the propensities that (...) make up a FIQ as quantifications of potential interaction. Under this model, the stable facts, relative facts, and shifting perspectives that make up the relational interpretation correspond to shifting digits and propensities of the FIQs. The model’s predictions agree with those of both classical and quantum physics, and it is indeterministic. We also propose explanations, with examples, for how the propensities of a FIQ are distributed, and how its digits become actualized. This is equivalent to the notion of the measurement problem, and the question of what causes wave function collapse. In short, by stepping through the “new door” opened by the language of FIQs, we attempt to describe the world under the relational interpretation. (shrink)

In recent works, Časlav Brukner and Jacques Pienaar have raised interesting objections to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. We answer these objections in detail and show that, far from questioning the viability of the interpretation, they sharpen and clarify it.

This paper compares and contrasts relational quantum mechanics with a pragmatist view of quantum theory. I first explain important points of agreement. Then I point to two problems faced by RQM and sketch DP?s solutions to analogous problems. Since both RQM and DP have taken the Born rule to require relative facts I next say what these might be. My main objection to RQM as originally conceived is that its ontology of relative facts is incompatible with scientific objectivity and undercuts (...) the evidential base of quantum theory. In contrast DP?s relative facts have all the objectivity we need to accept quantum theory as scientific knowledge. But a very recent modification to RQM has successfully addressed my main objection,bringing the two views into even closer alignment. (shrink)