Le Socrate de Xénophon et la démocratie présente une interprétation nuancée du témoignage de Xénophon sur l’attitude de Socrate à l’endroit de la démocratie athénienne. Cette étude conteste les interprétations qui ont été trop restrictives dans le choix des témoignages et trop négatives dans leurs conclusions. Elle tient compte, d’une part, des différents paramètres qui permettent de définir la démocratie ; d’autre part, des réalités de la démocratie athénienne. Les principaux textes pertinents proviennent des Mémorables. Nous traitons de la nature (...) de cet ouvrage et de la façon dont il expose l’attitude de Socrate à l’endroit des lois et des institutions du régime démocratique, notamment l’assemblée et le tirage au sort. Cette étude présente enfin une interprétation plus nuancée de la propre attitude de Xénophon à l’endroit de la démocratie, attitude qui a elle-même influé sur la façon dont on a, par le passé, évalué l’attitude de son Socrate.Xenophon’s Socrates and Democracy offers a balanced interpretation of Xenophon’s evidence for Socrates’ attitude to the Athenian democracy, arguing against interpretations that have been too selective in their evidence and too negative in their conclusions. It takes due account of the various parameters that define democracy and the realities of Athenian democracy. The main evidence is from Memorabilia. There is discussion of nature of this work, and then of how it expresses Socrates’ attitude to the laws of the democracy and other processes such as sortition and the assembly. The paper also offers a more balanced interpretation of Xenophon’s own attitude to democracy, which has influenced past assessments of the attitude of his Socrates. (shrink)

Late antique political Platonism was not unoriginal in its thought. The paper takes as an example the Justinianic dialogue On Political Science (ca. 550), which creatively engages with Plato’s political works. It shows that the dialogue tries – and manages, as I argue – to combine two apparently inconsistent Platonic models: what I call the “divine” model, in which a philosopher-king endowed with divine knowledge rules unhindered by civic laws; and the “human” model, characterized by the rule of law. The (...) divine model comes mostly from Plato’s Republic and Statesman; the human one, from the Laws. On Political Science demonstrates that its (anonymous) author was acquainted with these three Platonic texts, in addition to other texts. That is philologically noteworthy, but also philosophically interesting: the dialogue manages to integrate the two models into a common framework. It puts forward an original political model, in which a philosopher-king, although endowed with divine knowledge, still has to be bound by civic laws because of his human frailty. The article concludes by discussing the polemical import the dialogue could have had in its Justinianic context. (shrink)

At Statesman (Plt.) 291a–c and 303c–d, Plato compares the so-called statesmen of all existing constitutions to a motley crew of lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other beasts, and the entire section of the Statesman devoted to law and constitutions (291c–303c) to a satyr-play of sorts. This paper argues that these thought-provoking images are best understood as literary devices which, in addition to other dramatic elements in the Theaetetus and Sophist, help to bolster the unity of the Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman trilogy and its apologetic (...) agenda concerning Socrates. (shrink)

There are three major themes in the dialogue thought to be Plato’s Statesman: the nature of statesmanship, the difference between perfect and less than perfect regimes and the method of division. In this paper I focus on the first two themes. I argue, first, that the dialogue makes a plausible case for what it takes to be a wise statesman. In doing so, I play down the importance of the second theme: the difference between regimes. In fact, I consider this (...) discussion to be deeply flawed and even irrelevant to the argument of the first. My main purpose is to provide a critical analysis of the political theory articulated in the dialogue. My analysis is made plausible by abandoning the traditional view that the Statesman was written Plato in its entirety as a unified whole. In my view, a close reading of the text supports the hypothesis that it is, at best, semi-authentic; namely, that it is most likely a collage of fragments written at different times by Plato and other members of the Academy. (shrink)

The modern rationalist idea of rule of law, and modern rationalism in general, owes much to Plato and to Platonism. However, Plato’s stance towards the laws of the city is all but clear. On the one hand, we have the seemingly ‘totalitarian’ Plato of the Republic, a dialogue which defends the absolute authority of philosophical wisdom over all prescriptions that are ensuing from existing cities and their laws. On the other hand, we have the ‘more liberal-democratic’ Plato of the Laws, (...) a dialogue which promotes a combination of philosophical wisdom with rule of law. This ambivalence as to the issue of laws permeates one of the most enigmatic of Plato’s works, the Politicus, a dialogue that was written after the Republic and before the Laws. The present essay rejects both the ‘totalitarian’ and the ‘liberal-democratic’ understanding of Plato’s stance towards the laws of the city. The author defends the thesis that laws in the Politicus do not constitute a static Form that works against or with philosophical wisdom and/or democratic self-legislation, but a factor that generates a series of inescapable philosophical and political ambivalences. This approach corresponds with many of the findings of the so-called ‘post-modern jurisprudence’. That is, it brings to the fore the immanent aporias of philosophical dialectics, it emphasises the irreducible un-decidability between violence and consent as foundational elements of the law, and it stresses the adiakrisia between the poisonous and the healing effects of laws as regards the attainment of conditions of social and political justice. (shrink)

This article updates “The State of the Question in the Study of Plato” (Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1996) based on research covering the years from 1995–2015. Its three major parts examine: (1) how the mid‐twentieth‐century consensus has fared, (2) whether the new trends identified in that article have continued, and (3) identify trends either new or missed in the original article. On the whole, it shows the continuing decline of dogmatic and nondramatic Plato interpretation and the expansion and ramification of (...) the more literary, dramatic, and nondogmatic “new Platonism.” What was a growing insurgency twenty years ago can now be described as a, if not the, dominant approach. (shrink)

Vingt ans après le premier numéro de Philosophie Antique, consacré aux « Figures de Socrate », le panorama des études socratiques semble avoir été profondément modifié par certaines nouveautés en matière de contenu et de méthode, issues d’une meilleure compréhension du phénomène des logoi sokratikoi et de son importance dans l’histoire culturelle et politique athénienne des ve et ive siècles.L’usage de la méthode intertextuelle a non seulement contribué à briser le monopole platonicien dans la transmission du patrimoine socratique, mais également (...) à dépasser une lecture doctrinale des textes platoniciens, au profit d’une lecture plus attentive à la forme dialogique de l’écriture et à la logique interne de la représentation proposée par l’auteur : une mise en scène du débat éthique et politique du passé récent d’Athènes, dans lequel Socrate joue le rôle de conscience critique de la cité alors que Platon est tout simplement absent. Compte tenu de l’importance de cette reconstruction de la mémoire commune, dans le cadre des conflits d’idées et de références politiques qui impliquent certainement les socratiques, cet essai se propose de relire des aspects particuliers de la représentation platonicienne de Socrate : 1) la solitude du philosophe, obtenue aussi en minimisant et en discréditant la présence des socratiques autour de lui ; 2) l’« atopie » de Socrate, en tant que pratique du paradoxe incluant le renversement des canons traditionnels du savoir et du pouvoir ; 3) la vertu comme enjeu d’un défi dont dépend le choix des meilleurs hommes d’Athènes pour le gouvernement politique ; un défi dans lequel le Socrate platonicien prend une position très différente de celle d’Antisthène et de Xénophon, qui soulignent en revanche l’importance morale des vertus les plus dures (enkrateia, karteria), en évoquant un monde de valeurs semblable au modèle lacédémonien. Le but de cette recherche est de montrer que Platon expose une perspective politique divergente (par rapport à la cité démocratique et par rapport aux autres socratiques) à travers les choix pratiqués par son Socrate en matière de vertu. Ce sont des choix qui développent de manière cohérente le paradoxe de l’« atopie » de Socrate, nous permettant de tracer les lignes d’un dessin unitaire à travers différents contextes, y compris entre des dialogues traditionnellement considérés comme distants les uns des autres : entre le Protagoras et la République, ou entre le Criton, le Gorgias et le Politique. Le renversement des canons traditionnels trouve également son expression esthétique dans le masque de Socrate en Silène. (shrink)

La scrittura letteraria è sempre in qualche modo riscrittura. E per apprezzarne l’originalità occorre immergersi nel labirinto di citazioni di cui un testo d’autore abitualmente si compone. Ciò è tanto più vero nel caso della letteratura socratica, in cui tutto ciò che sappiamo di Socrate, come oggetto reale della rappresentazione, è appassionata trascrizione di una indimenticabile esperienza collettiva, riscritta a molte mani e in sé irrappresentabile. Di qui la tentazione (ricorrente nella...