Previous studies have considered different forms of economic and/or cultural appropriation between status-unequal groups, for example young, White, middle-class people cashing in on the music of urban, African-American culture. In this paper, however, we are interested in what we call ‘lateral appropriation’, the process whereby the discursive capital of one marginalized group is usurped by another similarly marginalized group. In particular, drawing illustrative data from a number of organizational websites, we examine the atheist movement's remetaphorized use of the homosexual ‘closet’ (...) and the related notion of ‘coming out’. Within the framework of critical discourse analysis, we view this particular instance of appropriation as a discursive recontextualization achieved primarily by strategically establishing certain ‘relations of equivalence’ which allow atheists to invoke a more immediately recognized identity politics. Specifically, we show how their appeals to the closet metaphor provide a cathartic vehicle for individual identity formation, activate a marginalized status, and mobilize political action. On this basis, we reflect on the consequences this lateral appropriation might have for the personal and political experiences of homosexuals in the context of a hegemonic order in which marginalized groups are bound to compete over reduced material and symbolic resources. (shrink)

Do members of cultural groups have special claims to own or control the products of the cultures to which they belong? Is there something morally wrong with employing artistic styles that are distinctive of a culture to which you do not belong? What is the relationship between cultural heritage and group identity? Is there a coherent and morally acceptable sense of cultural group membership in the first place? Is there a universal human heritage to which everyone has a claim? Questions (...) such as these concern the ethics of cultural heritage (or heritage ethics, for short). This entry seeks to provide an overview of the philosophical work on topics in heritage ethics, as well as introduce readers to some of the most philosophically relevant literature from other disciplines. (shrink)

Is there something morally wrong with cultural appropriation in the arts? I argue that the little philosophical work on this topic has been overly dismissive of moral objections to cultural appropriation. Nevertheless, I argue that philosophers working on epistemic injustice have developed powerful conceptual tools that can aid in our understanding of objections that have been levied by other scholars and artists. I then consider the relationship between these objections and the harms of cultural essentialism. I argue that focusing on (...) the systematic nature of appropriative harms may allow us to sidestep the problem of essentialism, but not without cost. (shrink)