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Repairing proofs of Arrow's general impossibility theorem and enlarging the scope of the theorem

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (4):879-890 (1979)

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Zur Philosophie der Demokratie: Arrow-Theorem, Liberalität und strukturelle Normen.Julian Nida-Rümelin - 1991 - Analyse & Kritik 13 (2):184-203.details The paradoxes and dilemmas of social choice theory can be taken as an argument against a certain view of democracy: For the identity theory democracy represents a collective actor standing for aggregated individual interests. According to a second model of society, democracy has its normative basis in structural traits of interaction and cooperation. Within the formal theory of politics both the Arrow-Theorem and the Liberal Paradox undermine the identity theory and give us reasons for the second, the normative theory which (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The importance of not existing. R. & V. Routley - 1979 - Dialogue 18 (2):129-165.details An Adequate theory of meaning and truth is semantically important. Such a theory necessarily includes in its analysis nonentities, items that do not exist. So what is semantically, and hence logically, important is bound to include nonentities. In virtue of the modifier ‘semantically“, the first premiss is analytic, and it is comparatively uncontroversial. By contrast the second premise of the syllogism, which we want to stick to, is decidedly controversial. So too is the thesis – which implies the inadequacy of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Nuclear energy and obligations to the future.R. Routley & V. Routley - 1978 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21 (1-4):133 – 179.details The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring long?term storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the appropriate type apply (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 17 citations
I. the durability of impossible objects.Richard Routley - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):247 – 251.details Meinong's theory of impossible objects is defended against a number of objections, in particular against Karel Lambert's argument (see Impossible Objects?, Inquiry, Vol. 17 [1974], pp. 303?14) that no objects are impossible. Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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