Switch to: References

Citations of:

Con-reasons as causes

David-Hillel Ruben

In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 62--74 (2009)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Not Doings as Resistance.Kaisa Kärki - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (4):364-384.details What does it mean to intentionally not perform an action? Is it possible to not perform an action out of resistant intention? Is there sufficient language for talking about this kind of behavior in the social sciences? In this article, a nonnormative vocabulary of not doings including resistant intentional omissions is developed. Unlike concepts that describe official, overt, and public resistance, James Scott’s everyday resistance and Albert Hirschman’s exit have made it possible to talk about the resistant inactions of agents (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Con-reasons and the causal theory of action.Jonathan D. Payton - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):20-33.details A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con- reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Investigating the other side of agency: A cross-disciplinary approach to intentional omissions.Kaisa Kärki - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Jyväskylädetails This study develops conceptual means in philosophy of agency to better and more systematically address intentional omissions of agents, including those that are about resisting the action not done. I argue that even though philosophy of agency has largely concentrated on the actions of agents, when applying philosophy of action to the social sciences, a full-blown theoretical account of what agents do not do and a non-normative conceptual language of the phenomena in question is needed. Chapter 2 aims to find (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

1