_ Source: _Volume 31, Issue 1, pp 75 - 92 The aim of this article is to explore some of what Hobbes says in _Leviathan_ about what the Leviathan is. I propose that Hobbes is not finally clear on this score. Nonetheless, such indeterminacy might be revealing, insofar as it points us in different directions regarding how the state can be conceptualized, and what it is thought able to do. The paper is thus deliberately open ended: it does not aim (...) to definitively settle interpretative issues, but rather to use Hobbes as a way of thinking about the differing potentials of state theory. (shrink)

This lecture presents the text of the speech about the genealogy of the modern state delivered by the author at the 2008 British Academy Lecture. It explains that to investigate the genealogy of the state is to discover that there has never been any agreed concept to which the word state has answered. The lecture suggests that any moral or political term that has become so deeply enmeshed in so many ideological disputes over such a long period of time is (...) bound to resist any efforts at definition. (shrink)

Hobbes is often portrayed as a thinker who anticipated modern constructivist ideas of fiction and representation according to which reality is simply a social construction. This article questions t...

There is an important but underappreciated ambiguity in Hobbes’ concept of personhood. In one sense, persons are representatives or actors. In the other sense, persons are representees or characters. An estate agent is a person in the first sense; her client is a person in the second. This ambiguity is crucial for understanding Hobbes’ claim that the state is a person. Most scholars follow the first sense of ‘person’, which suggests that the state is a kind of actor – in (...) modern terms, a ‘corporate agent’. I argue that Hobbes’ state is a person only in the second sense: a character rather than an actor. If there are any primitive corporate agents in Hobbes’ political thought, they are representative assemblies, not states or corporations. Contemporary political theorists and philosophers tend to miss what is unique and valuable about Hobbes’ idea of state personality because they project the idea of corporate agency onto it. (shrink)

Hobbes’s account of the sovereign’s right to punish in Leviathan has led to a longstanding interpretive dispute. The debate is prompted by the fact that, prima facie, Hobbes makes two inconsistent claims: subjects (i) authorize all the acts of the sovereign, and are hence authors of their own punishment, yet (ii) have the liberty to resist such punishment. I argue that attending to Hobbes’s surprisingly neglected account of power yields a novel interpretation of his theory of punishment. Hobbes, it turns (...) out, is working with two conceptions of power: potestas, a juridical power, and potentia, a factual power. Each power grounds one of the ‘inconsistent’ claims above: potestas founds the authorized condemnation by the legal system, and potentia the factual enforced penalty, which is not directly authorized and can be resisted. (shrink)

El propósito del presente trabajo consiste en explicar por qué Hobbes adopta una perspectiva corporativista para dar cuenta de la dinámica social y política que opera al interior del Leviatán. En concreto, intentaremos demostrar cómo el ordenamiento de la sociedad política en sistemas conducidos por representantes le permite a Hobbes establecer ciertas pautas en el desenvolvimiento de los conflictos públicos, fundamentalmente, la asignación de responsabilidades. A su vez, como hipótesis subsidiaria, argüiremos que el rol de la teoría de la representación (...) es central en la medida en que Hobbes no pretende eliminar la disputa política como tal, sino tan sólo deshacerse de su modalidad irregular. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper we deal with Hobbes’s elucidation of the political conflict caused by rebellious groups. First of all, we attempt to prove that groups are important characters in Hobbesian antagonisms. Secondly, it will be argued that the isomorphic structure that underlies all associations is vital to account for these disputes. To wit, the fact that minor corporate bodies are ‘similar’ vis à vis the State leaves a lengthy flank open to rebellion, since this homology may encourage their leaders (...) to compare themselves with the sovereign and to challenge his or her power. Whereas the inclusion of this trait may seem at face value paradoxical to Hobbes’s absolute order project, we shall contend that it is actually a way of ascribing responsibility to the leaders of rebellious groups. Furthermore, as a subsidiary hypothesis, it will be claimed that the centrality of the theory of represented corporations is a result of Hobbes’s aim to erase, not rebellion as such, but only its tumultuous setup. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article traces the considerable development of a language of representation derived from Cicero's De officiis from late antiquity into early modern scholastic political thought. Cicero turned to the term persona, which signified the mask worn by actors of ancient theatre, to describe the particular duty of a magistrate who was understood ‘to bear the person of the city [se gerere personam civitatis]’. Thomas Hobbes's reliance on this terminology for his theory of the state in Leviathan is well known, (...) and we are now increasingly aware of its centrality before Hobbes in parliamentary and humanist discourse. What we have yet to register, however, is the extent and depth of scholastic appropriations and refashionings of this vocabulary. Cicero's language of representation is persistently at work in scholastic writing, from Augustine and Aquinas to Suárez and Bellarmine, and it functions in ways that reveal remarkable continuities and discontinuities with respect to its classical origins. The first task of this article is to expose this neglected channel through which this language was transmitted into early modernity. The second is to begin illuminating the early stages of political representation in the ‘second scholastic’ with an analysis of Francisco de Vitoria's De potestate civili (1528). (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article aspires to make two original contributions to the vast literature on Hobbes’s account of the nature and person of the commonwealth: (1) I provide the first systematic analysis of his changing conception of ‘person’; and (2) use it to show that those who claim that the Hobbesian commonwealth is created by personation by fiction misconstrue his theory of the state. Whereas Elements/de Cive advance a metaphysics-based distinction between individuals (‘natural persons’) and corporations (‘civil persons’), from Leviathan onwards (...) Hobbes contrasts individuals acting in their own name (‘natural persons’) with representatives (‘artificial persons’). These changes notwithstanding, Hobbes retains the same corporate conception of the state throughout. On the prevailing ‘fictionalist’ interpretation, the sovereign brings the commonwealth into existence by representing it. I argue, rather, that as an incorporation of natural persons, the commonwealth becomes one person through the authorized (i.e. non-fictitious) representation of each constituent member singly by one common representative (‘the sovereign’). (shrink)

The paper examines Thomas Hobbes’s theory of the state and representation in light of the historical development of the idea of the people as a corporation and its use in late-medieval and early-modern theories of resistance. Consequently, it is argued that Hobbes’s use of a corporate metaphor for the state embodied a rejection of the ius gentium reading of the people as a corporate body that legitimised the right of resistance to the sovereign power. By incorporating the state, not the (...) people, and championing a single covenant of a dissociated multitude that leads to its generation, Hobbes undermined the basis on which advocates of popular sovereignty justified opposition to the sovereign; a prerogative derived in their eyes from a covenant between the people and the ruler. (shrink)