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  1. Cognitive Systems and the Changing Brain.Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):224-241.
    The notion of cognitive system is widely used in explanations in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Traditional approaches define cognitive systems in an agent-relative way, that is, via top-down functional decomposition that assumes a cognitive agent as starting point. The extended cognition movement challenged that approach by questioning the primacy of the notion of cognitive agent. In response, [Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2001. The Bounds of Cognition. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.] suggested that to have a clear understanding of what a cognitive (...)
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  • Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the Self.Robert D. Rupert - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (Online):1-26.
    This essay presents the conditional probability of co-contribution account of the individuation of cognitive systems (CPC) and argues that CPC provides an attractive basis for a theory of the cognitive self. I proceed in a largely indirect way, by emphasizing empirical challenges faced by an approach that relies entirely on predictive processing (PP) mechanisms to ground a theory of the cognitive self. Given the challenges faced by PP-based approaches, we should prefer a theory of the cognitive self of the sort (...)
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  • Delusion and Affective Framing.Rachel Gunn - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    Clinically significant delusion is a symptom of a number of mental illnesses. We rely on what a person says and how she behaves in order to identify if she has this symptom and it is clear from the literature that delusions are heterogeneous and extremely difficult to define. People with active delusions were interviewed to explore what it is like to develop and experience delusion. The transcribed interview data was analysed to identify themes and narrative trajectories that help to explain (...)
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  • Language and Equilibrium.J. L. Bermudez - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):294-298.
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  • Review of The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg. [REVIEW]P. Draper - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):291-293.
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  • Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science.W. E. Mann - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):302-304.
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  • Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension.R. D. Rupert - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):304-308.
    For well over two decades, Andy Clark has been gleaning theoretical lessons from the leading edge of cognitive science, applying a combination of empirical savvy and philosophical instinct that few can match. Clark’s most recent book, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, brilliantly expands his oeuvre. It offers a well-informed and focused survey of research in the burgeoning field of situated cognition, a field that emphasizes the contribution of environmental and non-neural bodily structures to the production of intelligent (...)
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  • Diotima's Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism From Leibniz to Lessing.P. Guyer - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):285-290.
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  • Neuroethics and the Ethical Parity Principle.Joseph P. DeMarco & Paul J. Ford - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (3):317-325.
    Neil Levy offers the most prominent moral principles that are specifically and exclusively designed to apply to neuroethics. His two closely related principles, labeled as versions of the ethical parity principle , are intended to resolve moral concerns about neurological modification and enhancement [1]. Though EPP is appealing and potentially illuminating, we reject the first version and substantially modify the second. Since his first principle, called EPP , is dependent on the contention that the mind literally extends into external props (...)
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