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  1. Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):473-495.
    Abstract This paper proposes that adopting a ?phenomenological stance? enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to (...)
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  • Certainty and delusion.Rick Bellaar - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (7):1–25.
    Delusions are often thought of as the hallmark of irrationality. Accepted definitions of delusion are cast in terms of epistemic features that reflect irrationality: impossibility or falsity of con...
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  • What Can We Learn From Children? A Reading of The Sound and the Fury.Marco Motta - 2023 - Critical Horizons 24 (1):60-75.
    In this paper, I am interested in how a novel can make us see children as active and direct witnesses of their time. Through a close reading of The Sound and the Fury, I ask what we (adults and scholars) can learn from children. By closely looking at the picture of the ordinary through the lens of Faulkner’s children recounting household events, I hope to show that they can inspire us to look differently at the world and teach us something (...)
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  • The nature of delusion: An analysis of the contemporary philosophical debates.Paredes Aline Aurora Maya - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Central Lancashire
    The present thesis surveys different philosophical approaches to the nature of delusions: specifically, their ontology. However, since none of the various theories of the nature of delusions succeeds, I argue that there must be something problematic about the form of the analyses commonly offered. My general conclusion is that one cannot characterize delusions without taking away what it is distinctive about them.
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