The “film as philosophy” (FAP) hypothesis turned into a field if its own right during the 2000s, after S. Mulhall’s On Film (2001). In this work, Mulhall defended that some films philosophize for themselves. This caused controversy. Around the same time of On Film’s release, B. Russell published the article “The philosophical limits of film” (2000). This article had one of the first attacks against FAP, posing some main objections based on metaphilosophical grounds, which were called the “generality” and the (...) “explicitness” objections. These objections made by Russell and by M. Smith are based on the idea that film and philosophy are too different in their purposes or ways of presentation, ideas that are grounded in implicit or explicit conceptions of philosophy. In this chapter, these will be analyzed, as well as some other metaphilosophically grounded objections, as a line of reasoning connecting to attempts of responding to them will be drawn. After doing so, it will be concluded that their metaphilosophical grounds are implausible, and, thus, they are not definite objections against FAP. (shrink)

This response article addresses the conception of “film as philosophy” developed by Shawn Loht in his book Phenomenology of Film: A Heideggerian Account of the Film Experience (2017), with specific attention to the relevance and implications of Loht's approach for the broader debate beyond a strictly Heideggerian film-philosophy. The article proceeds in three distinct takes. The first take examines Loht's later-Heideggerian inspirations, arguing that although these more fundamental notions of philosophy open significant possibilities for film as philosophy, they nevertheless run (...) the risk of being too embracive, as well as too elusive, to make a distinctive contribution to the debate. For its second take, the article resets its initial point of departure by considering how the earlier Heidegger of Being and Time cues in Loht's approach a special – albeit, ultimately, untenable – investment in cinematic reflexivity, with the stylistic hallmarks of Terrence Malick serving as a test case. In its final take, the article concludes by venturing a possible solution to the questions raised in the first two takes. Here it is proposed that, in contrast to Loht's general interest in cinematographic devices, the voiceover holds a far more sustainable promise of reflexivity, while at the same time giving more prominence to the viewer's acts of listening – which is what a quintessentially Heideggerian film phenomenology surely asks for. (shrink)