Apocalypse, it seems, is everywhere. Preachers with vast followings proclaim the world's end and apocalyptic fears grip even the non-religious amid climate change, pandemics, and threats of nuclear war. But as these ideas pervade popular discourse, grasping their logic remains elusive. Ben Jones argues that we can gain insight into apocalyptic thought through secular thinkers. He starts with a puzzle: Why would secular thinkers draw on Christian apocalyptic beliefs--often dismissed as bizarre--to interpret politics? The apocalyptic tradition proves appealing in part (...) because it theorizes a special relation between crisis and utopia. Apocalyptic thought points to crisis as the vehicle to bring the previously impossible within reach, thus offering apparent resources for navigating challenges in ideal theory, which tries to imagine the best and most just society. By examining apocalyptic thought's appeal and risks, this study arrives at new insights on the limits of ideal theory and utopian hope. (shrink)

Disagreements about abortion are often assumed to reduce to disagreements about fetal personhood (and mindedness). If one believes a fetus is a person (or has a mind), then they are “pro-life.” If one believes a fetus is not a person (or is not minded), they are “pro-choice.” The issue, however, is much more complicated. Not only is it not dichotomous—most everyone believes that abortion is permissible in some circumstances (e.g. to save the mother’s life) and not others (e.g. at nine (...) months of a planned pregnancy)—but scholars on both sides of the issue (e.g. Don Marquis and Judith Thomson) have convincingly argued that fetal personhood (and mindedness) are irrelevant to the debate. To determine the extent to which they are right, this article will define “personhood,” its relationship to mindedness, and explore what science has revealed about the mind before exploring the relevance of both to questions of abortion’s morality and legality. In general, this article does not endorse a particular answer to these questions, but the article should enhance the reader’s ability to develop their own answers in a much more informed way. (shrink)

Muchos comentadores leyeron “El origen de la obra de arte” de Martin Heidegger desde su compromiso político con el nacionalsocialismo. ¿Es el ensayo sobre el arte una encarnación de su verdadera posición política? El objetivo de esta investigación es volver a explorar los vínculos de esta obra de Heidegger con el nacionalsocialismo a la luz de algunos fragmentos de los llamados Cuadernos negros, en especial los del tomo 94 de la Gesamtausgabe que recopila las notas elaboradas por el filósofo entre (...) 1932 y 1938, años en los que se gestaron y expusieron las diferentes versiones de “El origen de la obra de arte”. La hipótesis que defiendo en este trabajo es que leer el ensayo sobre el arte desde su compromiso político es una interpretación injustificada. Se demostrará que, en los años que se gestaba y exponía el ensayo, Heidegger era crítico de las políticas culturales y artísticas en tiempos nacionalsocialistas. Con esto no pretendo ni negar la dimensión política en sentido general que puede llegar a tener el escrito, ni mucho menos la comprobada e indiscutible adhesión de Heidegger al nazismo. Pero si nos preguntamos si esto último es relevante para su filosofía del arte, la respuesta, a mi modo de ver, es que no. (shrink)

In this paper, we look at Richard Dawkins’ “Spectrum of Theistic Probabilities” from his book “The God Delusion”. The spectrum is edited to account for a mathematical error by Richard Dawkins. Correcting this oversight leads to 2 new theological positions being discovered. One of these positions is defended in detail. In its defense, we argue against a potential flaw of the position and also list a merit for the position among other arguments for the position. The merit involves a rebuttal (...) for Pascal’s wager found in no other piece of literature. (shrink)

Pascal Engel a publié un article intitulé « Le droit de ne pas croire ». Il y défend la thèse que les croyances religieuses sont incapables de satisfaire la norme épistémique de preuve ou de raison suffisante. Dès lors, elles seraient irrationnelles. Ne peut-on pas mettre en question une telle norme? Les croyances religieuses ne sont certes pas légitimes si elles sont fausses. Mais elles n’ont pas besoin d’être justifiées pour être rationnelles. Ma réponse à Pascal Engel suppose une épistémologie (...) différente de celle qu’il défend. Pascal Engel se situe dans un cadre déontologique, alors que je défends une conception arétique en épistémologie. À travers la question de la légitimité des croyances religieuses, c’est aussi ce que peut être l’épistémologie qui est examiné. (shrink)

A light form of value realism is defended according to which objective properties of comparison objects make value comparisons true or false. If one object has such a better-making property and another lacks it, this is sufficient for the truth of a corresponding value comparison. However, better-making properties are only necessary and usually not sufficient parts of the justifications of value comparisons. The account is not reductionist; it remains consistent with error-theoretic positions and the view that there are normative facts.