A typical expository strategy for the predictive processing account begins with perception and then extends to other cognitive domains, such as action or non-human animal cognition. Because this standard, perception-first expository strategy begins at the end of an evolutionary process, it may introduce both diachronic and synchronic distortions into the overall account. As far as the diachronic distortion is concerned, because the perception-first strategy presupposes a highly decoupled cognitive architecture, it invites us to project this architecture onto the coupled cognitive (...) systems of our evolutionary ancestors and other non-human organisms. Turning to the synchronic distortion, as the perception-first strategy is extended to conative states, it invites a cognitivism that seeks to reconstrue motivational states as a species of belief. In this paper, I explore what a predictive processing account would look like if it began at the beginning, with the highly coupled representations carried by our evolutionary ancestors and other non-human organisms. I conclude by exploring the proposal’s implications for a non-cognitivist, predictive processing account of action. (shrink)