Článek se zabývá způsobem, jakým vnímá vztah vědecké metody a demokracie Karl Popper. Toto sepětí je jedním ze základních atributů Popperova myšlení. Pro jeho pochopení je třeba zasadit Poppera do historického kontextu vývoje liberálního myšlení a poukázat na možné souvislosti se Schumpeterovou redefinicí demokracie. Výchozím bodem je však interpretace základních episte- mologických předpokladů Popperova myšlení - konceptů provizornosti vědeckého poznání a ratio negativa. Primárním cílem článku je kontextualizace těchto předpokladů s politologickými a sociologickými důsledky. Ty lze spatřovat nejen s odmítnutím (...) positivismu a esencialismu, ale také v Popperově preferenci volebních a stranických systémů. Na závěr je rozpracována problematika kritického racionalismu, hodnot a otevřené společnosti na základě možných námitek vůči Popperově teorii. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL AND WHITEHEAD ON THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN EDUCATION1 HOWARD WOODHOUSE Educational Foundations / University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, Sask., Canada S7N owo 1. RUSSELL, WHITEHEAD, AND PROCESS PHILOSOPHY W ere there no similarities between the philosophies of education of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, one would want to know why. Russell, after all, was Whitehead 's student as an undergraduate at Cambridge, his colleague and collaborator for (...) a dozen years working on the manuscript of Pri1!cipia Mathematica published in three volumes from 1910 to 1913, as well as his friend. Moreover, it was the sight of Whitehead's wife, Evelyn, in paroxysms of pain that prompted Russell's mystical experience in 1901, during which he tells us that he became a humanist, pacifist, and advocate of free schooling.2 In this paper, I consider the question of whether or not Russell's account of the process of growth in education is compatible with that of Whitehead. The question is important because it enables one to 1 Presented ar the annual meeting of rhe Association of Process Philosophy of Education, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, 25-7 April 1991. Brian Hendley was the respondent. I would like to thank the audience for its penetrating questions, as well as Don Cochrane, Brian Hendley, John McMurtry and Viola Safr for their comments on an earlier draft. 2 Auto., I: 149. For a psychoanalytic interpretation of Russell's "mystical illumination ", see Bennett and Nancy Simon, "The Pacifist Turn: an Episode of Mystic Illumination in Russell's Life", Russell, no. 13 (Spring 1974): Il-12, 17-24. Jo Vellacott believes that the term "pragmatic pacifist" more accurately desctibes Russell's ". Russell and Whitehead on the Process ofGrowth. 139 Whitehead the precise investigation of the natural world. Both the logical method and the precision of ideas that are learned in mathematics form the foundations of science and philosophy. Indeed, the structures of the physical world mirror those of mathematics, since they, too, are based upon relations among entities.1O The kind of understanding afforded by mathematics, therefore, is also the basis of philosophy, since it puts students in contact with long-lasting ideas having fundamental value, and enables them to gain a kind of liberation from the concerns of the everyday world. (2) Both Russell and Whitehead uphold the idea· that science is based on those kinds of sense-experience to which human beings have ready access (colours, sounds, smells, and observable objects, etc.).II The problem facing science at this point is to show how its generalizations are based upon these experiences. For Russell, induction fails because we can never prove the principle on the basis of experience without thereby begging the question.I:'- This is because the prin~iple of induction appeals to the future or to those unexperienced parts of the past or present with which we are not acquainted. As a result, Russell prefers to adopt a hypothetico-deductive method by which it is possible· to move from the sense-experience of everyday life to a systematic understanding of the structures of the universe. In this way, science is able to progress by means of "an application of mathematical probability to premisses arrived at independently of induction."I3 Whitehead also argues for the need for "careful scrutiny" in the manner in which we infer the existence of "the physical world [which] is, in some general sense of the term, a deduced concept."I4 In other words, like Russell, he prefers a more deductive kind of approach, suggesting that the theory of induction is the despair of philosophy.I5 10 Whitehead, The Aims ofEducation, pp. 82, 84, 89, 134, 155-7. Russell, PoM, pp. 448-9,471; PLA in LK, p. 207. II Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics" in Mysticism and Logic, pp. 145-79. Whitehead, of course, also includes feelings as integrating features of sense experience that allow us to relate the diverse elements of such experience into a unitary whole; see Process and Reality (New York: Free P., 1969), p. 244 and Part III. 12 Russell, PP, Chap. 6. His argument is mirrored by Whitehead, op. cit., pp. 235-6. lJ Russell, HK, p... (shrink)

This paper reflects on the implications of postmodern political discourse for East-Asian politics. It argues that the postmodernist deconstruction of modern epistemology and politics provides an opportunity for the reappraisal and rehabilitation of Confucianism in East Asia. First, the paper begins with an account of Cartesian epistemology which undergirds the liberal conceptions of selfhood and politics. Second, it provides a brief history of the Neo-Confucian synthesis and the resulting epistemology based on an intersubjective and ethical understanding of being human. Third, (...) it gives an account of how East Asian thinkers have until recently tried to overcome Confucianism as a way of achieving modernity. Fourth, it attempts to show how the Heideggerian deconstruction of Cartesian epistemology reveals the intersubjective and ethical nature of Dasein which allows for a reevaluation of Confucianism. In essence, this paper describes earlier attempts by East Asians to go beyond modernity and the way they have led to detrimental consequences. It concludes that the current debate should proceed with a more careful and balanced consideration of both modernity and Confucianism. (shrink)

While many (perhaps most) of those engaged in the study of philosophy would accept the continued reality and importance of an analytic/continental divide in the discipline, there has been no serious examination of the political dimensions of this rift. Here a series of political assumptions are revealed to be widely held among the British analytic philosophers who were active during the period in which the analytic/continental divide was being established. This paper will approach demonstrating the analysts’ beliefs about the political (...) affiliations of continental philosophy in three ways. Firstly, it will produce direct evidence of the analysts’ belief in the relationship between 19th century continental philosophy and various politically undesirable regimes. Secondly, it will examine in detail one illustrative example, that of Hegel. Thirdly, it will illustrate how the political beliefs already canvassed permeated beyond the limited political critique of continental philosophy into the analysts’ writing on the history of philosophy. (shrink)