Two of the major arguments against performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), appealing to fairness and the protection of athletes’ health, have serious flaws. First, there is no relevant moral distinction between the use of PEDs and the use of other performance enhancers that introduce unfairness and that we accept nonetheless. Second, prohibiting PEDs for athletes’ own good ignores the fact that adult athletes are constantly making tradeoffs to improve performance and pursue excellence, including sacrificing their health. We should not paternalistically impose our (...) values on them. On the other side, arguments to allow ‘safe’ PEDs provide no normative criterion to determine the acceptable level of risk, thus begging the question. The reasonable athlete argument solves both sets of problems: it justifies a ban on some performance-enhancing drugs based on health and fairness, while avoiding paternalism, and it also establishes a non-arbitrary standard to determine which drugs ought to be allowed. First, if unsafe PEDs were allowed, some athletes would refuse to take them out of concern for their health. This is a reasonable decision even though it would put them at a competitive disadvantage against athletes who choose to use unsafe PEDs. It would be unfair for clean athletes to suffer a competitive disadvantage for acting reasonably. Therefore, PEDs that pose significant health risks should be prohibited for all athletes. Second, it would be unreasonable for athletes to refuse, on principle, relatively safe and effective PEDs, so a blanket prohibition is also unjustified. Which drugs and which doses to allow should be determined not by athletes’ actual choices but by the hypothetical choices of the reasonable athlete. The resulting sport-specific drug policy would carve a justifiable middle path between complete prohibition and complete permission. (shrink)

Antidoping policy regulates and punishes the use of substances that are listed on a Prohibited List (PL). These substances are colloquially known as ‘performance-enhancing substances’. There is very little empirical evidence of enhancement for most of the substances on the PL raising the possibility that the perceived enhancement of performance experienced by an athlete is a placebo effect. A placebo effect is a response to an inert substance that is strongly influenced by psychological and social cues in the surrounding environment. (...) It is our contention that, given the lack of proper empirical testing of the substances on the PL, it is in fact the appearance of a substance on the PL that has the strongest performance-enhancing effect in elite athletes. This disconnect between science and WADA’s code raises the question of what we really object to: real performance enhancement achieved using substances on the PL or performance enhancement that occurs because WADA has told us that the substance will enhance performance by placing it on the PL? In this case, antidoping policy would punish those who believe the performance-enhancing myth at the heart of the PL thus leading to a deeply flawed policy that creates its own victims. (shrink)

We propose that doping be legalized under medical supervision. First, we discuss two motivations for allowing medically supervised doping. We reject the ‘compromised choice/harm minimization’ motivation as unlikely to win the support of athletes. We agree that it could lead to an arms race. Instead, we favor full acceptance of doping under medical supervision and answer Reid’s spirit of sport objection to medical manipulation. After presenting a set of guiding principles, we use them to answer the arms race objection and (...) rebut one of the most prominent objections in the literature about the safety of medically supervised doping, the game-theoretic objection. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present and critically discuss a gametheory- based argument in favour of the view that sports organizations ought to ban the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport. After presenting the argument in detail, I try to show that the argument is not convincing. First, the argument cannot be used to argue in favour of WADA’s (World Anti-Doping Agency) current ban on doping, at least if it rests on the assumption, that doping use is always (...) harmful. However, that in itself may not be a problem for adherents of the argument, and they can and should modify the harm assumption to cover only harmful use of doping. Second, even with this modification, it is argued that the harm assumption is flawed, for example, because it is not obvious why we should accept certain harms in sport but not harm to athletes caused by doping. Third, the argument is also flawed because it entails the non-competitive assumption: if all athletes dope, then no competitive advantages are gained by any athletes assumptions. The noncompetitive assumption is challenged in view of the observations that doping can have some non-competitive advantages and is, so to speak, not only a positional good and because doping, due to unequal responsiveness, can give some highly responsive athletes a competitive advantage over less responsive athletes. (shrink)

On May 15, 2006, 34 year-old mountaineer David Sharp died in a small cave a few hundred meters below the peak of Mount Everest in the aptly named “death zone”. As he lay dying, Sharp was passed by forty-plus climbers on their way to the summit, none of whom made an effort to rescue him. The climbers’ failure to rescue Sharp sparked much debate in mountaineering circles and the mainstream media, but philosophers have not yet weighed in on the issues. (...) This is surprising, since Sharp’s case raises interesting puzzles about the duty to rescue. Commonsense morality suggests that it was wrong for the climbers to put their summit bids ahead of saving a human life. But rescuing Sharp was extremely risky. If you and I are not required to assume significant risks to rescue others, why think the climbers had a moral duty to do this? My primary focus is on a new principle of rescue, which I dub the comparable risk principle, that has not been discussed in the duty-to-rescue literature. More generally, I explore the limits of the duty to rescue not just in Sharp’s case, but in relevantly similar high-risk environments common in action sports. (shrink)