Which properties are characteristic of the enthymeme in Aristotle's Rhetoric? There is no consensus on this point. The present discussion centres on three properties. 1. Is there always an implicit premise? (Answer: Above all, a pragmatic level and a logical level must be distinguished.) 2. Do the premises consist by definition of probabilities and signs? (Answer: No.). 3. Are all enthymemes reducible to a syllogistic form? (Answer: The literature pertaining to this question is dominated by a false dilemma: an enthymeme (...) does not have either a topical or a syllogistic structure). In general, Aristotle's approach to the enthymeme in the Rhetoric appears to shift from argumentation theory to logic. (shrink)

Escritura creativa es un término que apela a diversas posibilidades educativas y formativas a través del medio de la escritura. Para su realización concreta recurre a recursos y orientaciones procedentes de diversos saberes y disciplinas. Nuestra propuesta es acotar uno de estos significados de la escritura creativa y presentar su relación con la retórica, disciplina que puede aportar elementos significativos a los fines formativos de la escritura creativa, tal como la hemos acotado. Para esta acotación del significado narraremos primero brevemente (...) la historia de su constitución, y a continuación su finalidad como realidad formativa. Sobre la base de esta finalidad delimitaremos a grandes rasgos la disciplina de la retórica y presentaremos sus posibles aportaciones a la escritura creativa. (shrink)

In the present article I attribute to the common topic in the Rhetoric a two-fold suggestive function and a guarantee function. These three functions are possible because this type of topic, while often quite abstract, nevertheless contains thought-steering, substantial terms, and formulates a generally empirical or normative endoxon. Assuming that according to Aristotle an enthymeme has at least two premises, it would appear that a common topic is the abstract principle behind the often implicit major premise. This means that the (...) topic may be regarded as the – generalizing – if-then statement in a modern argumentation scheme. Therefore it should be possible to see the enthymemes of Rhetoric 2.23 as a combination of a logical argument form (which can usually be reconstructed as modus ponens) and an argumentation scheme – even though we may not attribute this idea to Aristotle himself. (shrink)

Aristotle considers all examples, as far as they are used as rhetorical arguments, to be inductions . On the other hand, he finds it worthwhile to distinguish different kinds of examples . Moreover, comparisons and fables are said to be “made” by the orator, whereas historical examples are not . The present article attempts to explain this opposition.A close examination of what can be meant by “induction” reveals that this term applies differently to historical examples and to comparisons and fables. (...) In a broader sense, all examples can be called inductions, insofar as a certain logical relation, different from the syllogistic one, obtains between conclusion and premises. This relation, however, is unable to explain why examples can serve as arguments. Applied to historical examples only, the term “induction” preserves its original meaning of checking samples in a number sufficient to yield generalization. In its narrow sense, “induction” gives a satisfactory account of how historical examples work. As for comparisons and fables — to which “induction” applies in a broader sense only — Aristotle fails to explain what makes them arguments. The explanation, missing in Rhetoric 2, 20, can, however, be given according to the general lines of Aristotelian dialectics and rhetorics. The main task of comparison and fable is to elaborate a so far unconsidered middle term meeting the following conditions: the hearer is prepared to agree that M applies to the subject of the conclusion and that the predicate of the conclusion applies to M. All examples make use of a general proposition from which their conclusion can be inferred. Historical examples produce instances, in order to confirm a proposition previously admitted as suitable premise, provided that its truth can be proved. Comparison and fables, by introducing a new middle term, try to form a premise susceptible of being admitted without proof. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that much can be gained for the analysis and evaluation of arguing when fallacies are not, or not only, conceived of as flawed premise–conclusion complexes but rather as argumentative moves which distort harmfully an interaction aiming at resolving communication problems argumentatively. Starting from Normative Pragmatics and the pragma-dialectical concept of fallacy, a case study is presented to illustrate a fallacy which is termed the 'revelation argument' because it is characterized by an interactor's revealing her (...) thoughts and/or emotions to the addressees and claiming that these would have justificatory or refutatory potential with respect to the problem discussed. Although the revelation argument may not be a paradigm case of resolution- hindering moves, it is an extreme case of flawed reasoning that illustrates plainly the advantages of a communicational perspective on arguing and fallacies. (shrink)