Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Phenomenology is not phenomenalism. Is there such a thing as phenomenology of sport?Jan Halák, Ivo Jirásek & Mark Stephen Nesti - 2014 - Acta Gymnica 44 (2):117-129.
    Background: The application of the philosophical mode of investigation called “phenomenology” in the context of sport. Objective: The goal is to show how and why the phenomenological method is very often misused in the sportrelated research. Methods: Interpretation of the key texts, explanation of their meaning. Results: The confrontation of concrete sport-related texts with the original meaning of the key phenomenological notions shows mainly three types of misuse – the confusion of phenomenology with immediacy, with an epistemologically subjectivist stance (phenomenalism), (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Why Teamwork is Not a Virtue: A response to Gaffney.Emily Ryall - 2015 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 42 (1):57-62.
    This paper seeks to provide a response to Gaffney's analysis of teamwork by arguing that teamwork is morally neutral rather than a virtue in itself. This conclusion will be supported by examples which demonstrate how teamwork can develop and foster undesirable traits and practices such as resentment, contempt and the purely instrumental use of others in the achievement of desired ends.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Phenomenal Case for Sport.Jens E. Birch - 2009 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 3 (1):30-48.
    The article attempts to show some limitations to reductive accounts in science and philosophy of body-mind relations, experience and skill. Extensive literature has developed in analytic philosophy of mind recently due to new technology and theories in the neurosciences. In the sporting sciences, there are also attempts to reduce experiences and skills to biology, mechanics, chemistry and physiology. The article argues there are three fundamental problems for reductive accounts that lead to an explanatory gap between the reduction and the conscious (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations