I make the case that what gets called epistemic paternalism isn’t correctly labelled as such. This mislabelling is problematic for two reasons. First, paternalism in general faces strong challenges to its permissibility. Second, the scope for action of epistemic paternalism is somewhat narrow given the typical concerns of applied epistemology. Having clarified epistemic paternalism and discussed the above considerations, this paper introduces epistemic benevolence. The case is made that the epistemic benevolence-based approach can avoid some of the strong challenges that (...) epistemic paternalism faces and is often more suitable for the concerns of applied epistemology than a paternalist approach. To make these points, first, I make the case for a particular analysis of the epistemic paternalist act and, second, I explain epistemically benevolent acts as acts motivated by a concern for the epistemic welfare of another agent or agents. Given this characterisation, I argue that epistemic benevolence includes epistemic paternalism but extends beyond epistemic paternalism. I consider an objection to epistemic benevolence, which motivates laissez faire epistemic liberalism, a rival theoretical approach. Outlining this alternative serves to provide a further theoretical option relevant for work in applied epistemology. I offer some considerations as to why epistemic benevolence approach should still be favoured. (shrink)