The article discusses the role of intuition for insight. Creativity provides heuristic solutions to problems that are intractable if approached in standard, algorithmic ways. Intuition is claimed to occur during the incubation phase and to crucially depend on embodied memory and unconscious processing of memories, such as reconstruction and recreation. Two suggestions as to how memory contributes to intuition, and by which processes are analysed and compared: Barsalou & Prinz’ and Langley & Jones’.

1. Introduction The main question in this article is how egoism evidence can consistent with the theory of divine grace and God’s original Favor to the “other”? In addition, the hypothesis is that: Egoism in the human realm is contradicted by Altruism, but of God Egoism does not conflict with Altruism. The reason for this is the unity of God, as the absolute perfect does not have any defect. Sadra’s philosophy is: The attention of God to the creatures requires perfectibility, (...) and the perfectibility is a sign of defect. Therefore, if God wants to be Altruism, it must be incomplete, while God is Super perfection, so God is not Altruism. The second obstacle to God’s Altruism in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is In Islamic philosophy in general and in Sadra’s philosophy in particular, it is said that: God loves himself, and his love for himself requires his love for the world. Because the whole world is his works and love is effective, it is the same love for the work. In other words: God’s love for creatures, then his love for himself and his love for himself. Therefore, God has an extraordinary interest to others, and this can be contrasted with the transformation in which the noble intention is raised. Then all ends come to the subject, and referring all ends to the subject can be a kind of Egoism in which the acts of any being, including God, are always affected by one motive, and that motive is nothing but the Self-love and God is no exception to this rule. Therefore, God is not Altruism. In this study, based on the internal possibilities of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, we are in this study, based on the internal possibilities of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy; we are Analyzed two of these obstacles and criticize. 2. Material and Method In this paper, the library method is used, and it is the method of content analysis, and the opposite evidence of the problem will be presented, explained and analyzed, and argued for the benefit of the problem. The structure of this paper will thus be that in the first part, the literature of the research will be titled and the opposite evidence of the problem will be clarified, then the opposite evidence will be criticized, finally, the Conclusion will be made. 3. Conclusion 1. The center of psychological and moral egoism is in the human domain, but it is possible to search for the components of egoism in a metaphysical domain, which does not mean a Category Mistake and does not apply a blind metaphor to the facts. 2. In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, there are two main obstacles in the issue of God’s Altruism, namely: “Excellent no attention to below” and “reference for all purposes to the subject”. In the present study, these two obstacles have been criticized, and it has been shown that God is not egoism, but he is an Altruism, and since God is the ultimate being and the ultimate perfection, he is the most complete Altruism. In addition, because he is rich, he is absolute to provide the best of good for others without any reason. 3. An excellent being, such as God, which is by defining the most complete being, consists of all perfections, including justice, based on the principle of justice, does not injustice anyone, and It does not need the interests and perfection. And don’t conflict between its interests and the “other” interests. Therefore, there is no conflict with God’s Altruism. 4. In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, according to the principle of “simple reality is everything” and the existential analysis of the principle of causation, one can show that “reference for all purposes to the subject” is not in conflict with the original attention of God. References Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, translated and edited by Roger crisp, Cambridge university press. Ayn Rand the Virtue of Selfishness, A New Concept of Egoism, New York, the Objectivist Newsletter. Campbell ‘Egoism’ in Encyclopedia of ETHICS, Volume I –G, Second Edition, Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker Editors, Rutledge New York, and London. Dienstbier, Richard A and others Evolutionary Psychology and Motivation. Holmes, Robert L. The Basics of Ethics Philosophy, Translated by Masoud Oliya, Tehran, Phoenix. [In Persian] Francana, William K. Moral Philosophy, Hadi Sadeghi Translation, Qom, Tae. [In Persian Kratt, Richard, "Self-esteem and Transformation in Moral Philosophy", Nassiri, Mansour, Marefat, Khordad, No. 78, pp. 53-55. [In Persian] Maslow, Abraham Motivation and Personality, Harper and Row. Sadr-Aladdin‌ Shirazi, Muhammad,. ‌‌‌‌‌Four Journeys. Qom: Maktabat-Mostafavi. [In Arabic] Sadr-Aladdin‌ Shirazi, Muhammad,.Al-Asrar-Al-Ayat. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Theosophy and Philosophy. [In Arabic] Sadr-Aladdin‌ Shirazi, Muhammad,. Al-Shavahed Al-Rububiyah. Thran: University Publishing Centre. [In Arabic] Sadr-Aladdin‌ Shirazi, Muhammad,. Mafatih Al-Gheib. Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. [In Arabic]. (shrink)

A brief historical and conceptual account of the concept of imagination.

Este artigo tem como objetivo principal apresentar uma reconstruçáo lógico-conceitual e avaliaçáo de três argumentos de Skinner para a tese de que os termos psicológicos comuns sáo, em geral, inadmissíveis em análise do comportamento (a tese da inadmissibilidade). Começamos fazendo uma revisáo da abordagem de tais termos sustentada por Skinner, particularmente sua abordagem das categoriais de termos psicológicos disposicionais. Muito dela é aqui aceito, mas adotamos, como hipótese de trabalho, um desacordo com a premissa de Skinner de que eles sejam (...) irremediavelmente mentalistas. Nossa análise mostra que, se esta hipótese estiver correta, entáo os argumentos analisados náo resultam ser inteiramente plausíveis; e, embora a opçáo do autor seja plenamente aceitável, também o é uma (em princípio) opçáo alternativa, que explore os valores heurísticos de tais termos (sem incorporá-los ao vocabulário de base) para a descoberta de padrões comportamentais e seus contextos, em ambientes abertos de pesquisa. Um objetivo colateral deste artigo é mostrar o equívoco de duas suposições muitas vezes assumidas em filosofia da mente sobre o behaviorismo radical: a de que ele náo tem uma abordagem relevante sobre o funcionamento dos termos em questáo e a de que sua tese da inadmissibilidade se baseia em premissas verificacionistas. (shrink)

Professor Foxall suggests the radical behaviorist language of contingencies is fine as far as it goes, and is quite suitable for matters of prediction and control. However, he argues that radical behaviorist language is extensional, and that it is necessary to formally incorporate the intentional idiom into the language of behavioral science to promote explanations and interpretations of behavior that are comprehensive in scope. Notwithstanding Professor Foxall's arguments, radical behaviorists hold that the circumstances identified by the use of the intentional (...) idiom are accommodated by the radical behaviorist language of contingencies, not only for prediction and control but also for explanations and interpretations. Of central importance is that individuals may have histories that lead them to generate descriptions of past and present behavior, as well as descriptions of prevailing circumstances that have caused that behavior or are likely to cause that behavior in the future. The resulting verbal behavior may then enter into contingencies influencing their behavior, although the extent to which it does so varies across individuals as a function of their histories. Overall, the way that the pragmatism of radical behaviorism conceives of the nature and contribution of covert events differs appreciably from the way Professor Foxall conceives of the nature and contribution of intentional phenomena. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind was published in 1949. According to Ryle, his "destructive purpose" was to show that "a family of radical category mistakes" is the source of the "official doctrine," that is, a "double-life theory," according to which "with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind." By numerous examples, Ryle showed quite forcefully how psychology and philosophy at the time were misled into asking the (...) wrong kinds of questions. More than 50 years have elapsed since the original publication of Gilbert Ryle's book and, as Ullin T. Place wrote shortly before passing away, Ryle's conceptual analysis is now due, if not overdue, for a comeback. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the persistent relevance of category mistakes to current problems in the analysis of behavior. (shrink)

The concept of rule-governed behavior is often used in the analysis of problem solving, conceptualization, and thinking. Rule-governed behavior has been described as behavior that is controlled by verbally constructed and transmitted discriminative stimuli. Instructions, advice, and examples are typical instances of rules that govern behavior during acquisition in problem solving situations. Nevertheless, some problems arise in identifying instructions with rules and instructionally-controlled behavior with rule-governed behavior. In this article, I argue that instructions, as instances of constructed discriminative stimuli, are (...) the outcome of abstract stimulus control in humans. Descriptions of contingencies and performance may result from effective performance under abstract stimulus control. Instructions, as stimulus conditions, do not necessarily reproduce the abstract contingencies under which they were constructed. Therefore, instructions and self-instructions do not control abstract behavior. Instructions shape up new effective behavior by prompting and restricting response variation. A conceptual analysis along these arguments suggests that the usefulness of the distinction between rule-governed and contingency-shaped behaviors is questionable. (shrink)

``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb´to be´that looks as if it functions in the same way as´to eatánd´to drink´, as long as (...) we still have the adjectives´identical´,´true´,´false´,´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can seèthe limits of human understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` ´ This quote is from Ludwig Wittgenstein who redefined philosophy some 70 years ago (but most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has been a philosopher for some 40 years, is one them. It is also curious that both he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but Searle got the point and Dennett did not. Dennett is a hard determinist (though he trys to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose famous book´The Concept of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the ghost but it left the machine. Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others since) have exposed in detail. Our use of the words consciousness, choice, freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, event(and so on endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion but as soon as we leave normal life and enter philosophy(and any discussion detached from the environment in which language evolved) chaos reigns. Like most Dennet lacks a coherent framework-which Searle has called the logical structure of rationality. I have expanded on this considerably since I wrote this review and my recent articles show in detail what is wrong with Dennet's approach to philosophy. Let me end with another quote from Wittgenstein--´Ambition is the death of thought´. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

What becomes of our clearest theories of explanation, when faced with the unpalatable quantum phenomena that seem to undermine the direct conceptual connection between the fundamental material entities and the self-standing material objects of everyday parlance? The general explanatory theory advocates unification of explanatory concepts with everyday discourse, identification of essentially similar characteristics between direct experience and the hypothesised explanatory ontology, and a conceptualisation of phenomena in terms of objects enduring causally regulated change. On the other hand quantum theory feeds (...) antirealist suspicions about the worth of realist explanatory endeavour with examples of phenomena in which the structure of material separation and individuation based on spatial extension is insufficient for construction of deeper explanatory narratives. An example from history of science, that of Newton’s law-constitutive definition of objects in response to D escartes problem of bodies is used to suggest a possible strategy for explanations unifying the quantum and common-sense conceptual domains, provided the anti-realist challenge to such enterprise is read as questioning the epistemological justification of interpretation of experience in both cases.Što se događa s najjasnijim dostupnim teorijama objašnjenja kada se suoče s problematičnim kvantnim pojavama koje naizgled potkopavaju neposrednu konceptualnu poveznicu između fundamentalnih materijalnih entiteta i samoopstojnih materijalnih predmeta iz svakodnevnog govora? Opća teorija objašnjenja preporuča objedinjenje teoretskih eksplanatornih pojmova sa svakodnevnim govorom, određenje esencijalno sličnih karakteristika između neposrednog iskustva i hipotetske eksplanatorne ontologije te konceptualizaciju pojava kroz predmete koji istraju kroz uzročno regulirane promjene. S druge strane, kvantna teorija potkrjepljuje antirealistične sumnje o valjanosti eksplanatornog nastojanja realizma primjerima pojava u kojima je struktura materijalne razdvojenosti i individuacije temeljene na prostornoj protežnosti nedovoljna za izgradnju dubljih eksplanatornih narativa. Primjerom iz povijesti znanosti, Newtonovom definicijom predmeta temeljenom na zakonima kao odgovorom na Descartesov problem materijalnih tijela, daje se moguća strategija izgradnje objašnjenja koja objedinjuju kvantne i “zdravorazumske” konceptualne domene, ukoliko se antirealistična kritika te izgradnje u oba slučaja shvati kao propitivanje epistemološkog opravdanja tumačenja iskustva. (shrink)

John Heil’s From an Ontological Point of View (Heil 2003) is a tremendous philosophical work. The neo-Lockean ontology the reader finds within its 267 pages is a sensible and refreshing alternative to the neo-Humean ontologies which presently occupy the vast majority of the metaphysical literature. What Heil offers is a much needed change in perspective. Nor are the strengths of the book limited to Heil’s willingness to approach central metaphysical problems in largely untried and unpopular way; the book is very (...) clear in its presentation, accessible to wide readership, and tightly argued throughout. Heil’s efforts in this book are to be applauded, and the result is one that warrants serious consideration by all those interested in serious metaphysics. But the interest should not end there: the lessons of Heil’s book are ones that almost all philosophers ought to take seriously. Despite the criticism that follows, my overall position should not be taken as anything short of a whole-hearted endorsement of Heil’s book. Nonetheless, when philosophy is one’s trade, there is always going to be something to disagree about, however much one is amenable to a view. (shrink)