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Realism and the limits of explanatory reasoning

In The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. New York: Routledge. pp. 200-211 (2017)

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  1. Physicists’ views on scientific realism.Céline Henne, Hannah Tomczyk & Christoph Sperber - 2024 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (1):1-27.
    Do physicists believe that general relativity is true, and that electrons and phonons exist, and if so, in what sense? To what extent does the spectrum of positions among physicists correspond to philosophical positions like scientific realism, instrumentalism, or perspectivism? Does agreement with these positions correlate with demographic factors, and are realist physicists more likely to support research projects purely aimed at increasing knowledge? We conducted a questionnaire study to scrutinize the philosophical stances of physicists. We received responses from 384 (...)
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  • (In)effective realism?Juha Saatsi - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-16.
    Matthias Egg argues that scientific realism can be reconciled with quantum mechanics and its foundational underdetermination by focusing realist commitments on ‘effective’ ontology. I argue in general terms that Egg’s effective realism is ontologically overly promiscuous. I illustrate the issue in relation to both Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics.
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  • (1 other version)The Middle Way to Reality: on Why I Am Not a Buddhist and Other Philosophical Curiosities.Christian Coseru - 2021 - Sophia 60 (3):1-24.
    This paper examines four central issues prompted by Thompson's recent critique of the Buddhist modernism phenomenon: (i) the suitability of evolutionary psychology as a framework of analysis for Buddhist moral psychological ideas; (ii) the issue of what counts as the core and main trajectory of the Buddhist intellectual tradition; (iii) the scope of naturalism in the relation between science and metaphysics, and (iv) whether a Madhyamaka-inspired anti-foundationalism stance can serve as an effective platform for debating the issue of progress in (...)
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  • On Pursuing the Dialogue Between Buddhism and Science in Ways That Distort Neither.Christian Coseru - 2021 - APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies 20 (2):8-15.
    This paper examines two central issues prompted by a recent critique of this Buddhist modernist phenomenon in Evan Thompson’s Why I Am Not a Buddhist: (i) the suitability of evolutionary psychology as a framework of analysis for Buddhist moral psychological ideas; and (iv) whether a Madhyamaka-inspired anti-foundationalism stance can serve as an effective platform for debating the issue of progress in science. The main argument of this paper is that if Buddhism is to enter into a fruitful dialogue with the (...)
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  • Realism and Explanatory Perspectivism.Juha Saatsi - 2020 - In Michela Massimi & Casey D. McCoy (eds.), Understanding Perspectivism (Open Access): Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects. New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    This chapter defends a (minimal) realist conception of progress in scientific understanding in the face of the ubiquitous plurality of perspectives in science. The argument turns on the counterfactual-dependence framework of explanation and understanding, which is illustrated and evidenced with reference to different explanations of the rainbow.
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  • Misconceptions in Science.Christophe Malaterre, Emmanuelle J. Javaux & Purificación López-García - 2023 - Perspectives on Science 31 (6):717-743.
    Disagreement in science exists in a variety of strengths, from doubt-raising articles and issues of non-reproducibility up to raging disputes and major controversies. An often-latent form of disagreement consists of misconceptions whereby false ideas are held that run contrary to what is commonly accepted as knowledge. Misconceptions have been the focus of much research in education science and psychology. Here we draw attention to misconceptions that may arise in the very practice of science. We highlight formal features that can be (...)
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  • We Have Never Been “New Experimentalists”: On the Rise and Fall of the Turn to Experimentation in the 1980s.Jan Potters & Massimiliano Simons - 2023 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 13 (1):91-119.
    The 1980s, it is often claimed, was the decade when experimentation finally became a philosophical topic. This was the responsibility, the claim continues, of one particular movement within philosophy of science, called “new experimentalism.” The aim of this article is to complicate this historical narrative. We argue that in the 1980s, the study of experimentation was carried out not by one movement with one particular aim but rather in a diverse and open-ended way by people with different aims and backgrounds. (...)
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  • Nietzsche Was No Perspectivist.Michael Lewin - 2024 - Philosophies 9 (1):9.
    There is a widespread agreement that Nietzsche has developed a kind of position or doctrine called ‘perspectivism’. Scholars go on and develop metaphysical, semantic, epistemic, and psychobiological interpretations of the supposed Nietzschean perspectivism or even ‘perspectivisms’. They engage in debates about whether this perspectivism is relativistic, realistic, or anti-realistic and what the tenets of perspectivism are. In this paper, I suggest putting an end to this practice. I examine Nietzsche’s explicit mentions of the term ‘perspectivism’, the problems associated with the (...)
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  • La teoría correspondentista de la verdad y la confirmación científica.Damián Islas Mondragón - 2021 - Sophia. Colección de Filosofía de la Educación 31:65-87.
    Históricamente, en los principales análisis filosóficos sobre el concepto de ‘verdad’ estuvo implícita lo que hoy se conoce como la teoría correspondentista de la verdad, la cual puede ser trazada desde Aristóteles hasta Immanuel Kant. A principios del siglo XIX, los detractores de la teoría correspondentista de la verdad comenzaron a argumentar, entre otras cosas, que esta postura es oscura, demasiado estrecha y autocomplaciente o argumentativamente circular. No obstante, en el ámbito científico algunos defensores de ciertas posturas realistas de la (...)
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  • Metaphysical Causal Pluralism: What Are New Mechanists Pluralistic About?Michał Oleksowicz - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-22.
    Although the literature on the issue of pluralism within the philosophy of science is very extensive, this paper focuses on the metaphysical causal pluralism that emerges from the new mechanistic discussion on causality. The main aim is to situate the new mechanistic views on causation within the account of varieties of causal pluralism framed by Psillos ( 2009 ). Paying attention to his taxonomy of metaphysical views on causation (i.e., the straightjacket view, the functional view, the two-concept view, the agnostic (...)
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  • Scientific realism and quantum theory: on the status of the ‘unobservables’.Arunima Chakraborty - 2023 - Journal of Critical Realism 22 (3):445-466.
    Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical (...)
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  • The Empirical Under-Determination Argument Against Scientific Realism for Dual Theories.Sebastian De Haro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):117-145.
    This paper explores the options available to the anti-realist to defend a Quinean empirical under-determination thesis using examples of dualities. I first explicate a version of the empirical under-determination thesis that can be brought to bear on theories of contemporary physics. Then I identify a class of examples of dualities that lead to empirical under-determination. But I argue that the resulting under-determination is benign, and is not a threat to a cautious scientific realism. Thus dualities are not new ammunition for (...)
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