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  1. Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the cap. A note.Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez - 2005 - Theoria 20 (2):183-190.
    Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing specialconstraints on F. RelationaI ternary semantics are provided.
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  • Converse Ackermann property and constructive negation defined with a negation connective.Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (2):113-130.
    The Converse Ackermann Property is the unprovability of formulas of the form (A -> B) -> C when C does contain neither -> nor ¬. Intuitively, the CAP amounts to rule out the derivability of pure non-necessitive propositions from non-necessitive ones. A constructive negation of the sort historically defined by, e.g., Johansson is added to positive logics with the CAP in the spectrum delimited by Ticket Entailment and Dummett’s logic LC.
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  • Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the CAP. A note.Gemma Robles & José Méndez - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20 (2):183-190.
    La "Conversa de la Propiedad Ackermann" (CAP) es la no demostrabilidad de proposiciones puramente no-necesitivas a partir de proposiciones necesitivas. En nuestro trabajo definimos las dos restricciones básicas de la lógica intuicionista mínima con la CAP.
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