The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.

ANONYMITY: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALFRED SCHUTZ by Maurice Natanson Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. 172 pp., $25.00.

Chomsky behauptet, daß das Bewußtsein die Struktur eines grammatischen Übersetzungsapparates hat, Freud dagegen betrachtet es als einen unbewußten Geisteszustand. Es wird gezeigt, wie sich diese Theorien innerhalb einer Metaphysik des Bewußtseins vereinbaren lassen, die nur bewußte Geisteszustände als grundlegend, Sinneswahrnehmungen, Bilder, Emotionen und dergleichen als sekundär, und veranlagungsbedingte Geisteszustände als tertiär bezeichnet. Hervorzuheben wäre, daß grammatische Übersetzungsapparate und unbewußte Geisteszustände, wie alle menschlichen Veranlagungen, als Eigenheiten des Körpers, welcher gewissen Gesetzen und Prinzipien unterliegt, zu analysieren sind.

In several recent publications (Sampson [1978], [1980a]) Geoffrey Sampson has argued that an essentially Popperian language acquisition device could learn language much as a human child does. The device Sampson envisions would freely (or perhaps randomly) generate hypotheses about the grammar the child seeks to learn, and test these hypotheses against the data available to the child. If the data are incompatible with an hypothesis, the hypothesis is rejected and another one tried. If any hypothesis does not conflict with the (...) data, it is retained for further testing. Sampson's language acquisition device exhibits a Popperian proclivity for strong, simple hypotheses, but when it sets out on its acquisition task it has no a priori information about the nature of the grammar it seeks to acquire. If Sampson is right, then there is no need to postulate rationalist learning mechanisms of the sort advocated by Noam Chomsky (in Chomsky [1975] and many other publications) to account for the child's ability to learn language. However, it is my view that Sampson's argument is fatally flawed. He has not shown that a Popperian learning mechanism could duplicate the child's feat. Indeed, I think it can be shown that Sampson's Popperian learner could not possibly match the language learning achievement of the normal child, save by miraculous accident. (shrink)

Theoretical questions concerning language and communication figure prominently throughout the work of the Czech-British social philosopher and anthropologist Ernest Gellner. The article traces the development of Gellner’s linguistic thought from his early, controversial engagements with Ordinary Language Philosophy to his responses to Chomsky’s work in linguistics and his late-career assessments of Wittgenstein and particularly Malinowski whose – subsequently repudiated – view of the fundamental difference between the alleged “primitive” and “scientific” functions of language turns out to play a central explanatory (...) role in Gellner’s renowned theory of nationalism. The key to understanding Gellner’s thinking on language is to grasp both his adherence to a “telementational” model of communication and his scientism. This leads him to embrace the view that modern national cultures are predicated upon an industrial-scientific mode of cognition which both requires and entails a radically distinctive metaphysics of communication, namely one which allows for the conveyance of culture-transcending, “context-free” conceptual content. This, I claim, is a serious error which stems in large part from a misdiagnosis of the cognitive and communicative consequences of literacy and in particular a failure to correctly apprehend what linguist Roy Harris has termed the “autoglottic space” engendered by the availability of writing. (shrink)