A comment on Paul Schoemaker's target article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14 (1991), p. 205-215, "The Quest for Optimality: A Positive Heuristic of Science?" (https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00066140). This comment argues that the optimizing model of decision leads to an infinite regress, once internal costs of decision (i.e., information and computation costs) are duly taken into account.

If neuroscience is to contribute to economics, it will do so by the way of psychology. Neural data can and do lead to better psychological theories, and psychological insights can and do lead to better economic models. Hence, neuroscience can in principle contribute to economics. Whether it actually will do so is an empirical question and the jury is still out. Economics currently faces theoretical and empirical challenges analogous to those faced by physics at the turn of the twentieth century (...) and ultimately addressed by quantum theory. If will emerge in the coming decades, it may well be founded on such concepts as cognitive processes and brain activity. (shrink)

The examples and concepts that Shoemaker cites are rather heterogeneous. Some distinctions need to be drawn. An optimality thesis involves not just an ordering of options, but a value judgment about them. So let us begin by distinguishing minimality from optimality. And the concept of minimality can play a variety of roles, among which I distinguish between extremum descriptions, statements hypothesizing an optimizing process, and methodological recommendations. Finally, I consider how the three categories relate to Shoemaker’s question that “Who is (...) optimizing: the scientist or nature?” . (shrink)

In this paper, I draw a parallel between the stability of physical systems and that of economic ones, such as the US financial system. I argue that the use of equilibrium assumptions is central to the analysis of dynamic behavior for both kinds of systems, and that we ought to interpret such idealizing strategies as footholds for causal exploration and explanation. Our considerations suggest multi-scale modeling as a natural home for such reasoning strategies, which can provide a backdrop for the (...) assessment and prevention of financial crises. Equilibrium assumptions are critical elements of the epistemic scaffolding that make up multi-scale models, which we should understand as a means of constructing explanations of dynamic behavior. (shrink)

This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of one of science's most pervasive and flexible metaprinciples;optimalityis used to explain utility maximization in economics, least effort principles in physics, entropy in chemistry, and survival of the fittest in biology. Fermat's principle of least time involves both teleological and causal considerations, two distinct modes of explanation resting on poorly understood psychological primitives. The rationality heuristic in economics provides an example from social science of the potential biases arising from the extreme flexibility of (...) optimality considerations, including selective search for confirming vidence, ex post rationalization, and the confusion of prediction with explanation. Commentators are asked to reflect on the extent to which optimality is an organizing principle of nature, a set of relatively unconnected techniques of science, a normative principle for rational choice and social organization, a metaphysical way of looking at the world, or something else still. (shrink)

The current context of global efforts in the pursuit of sustainable development can be characterized by the perception of the scientific-technological losses of ecosystems and ecosystem services and their consequences for the survival of humanity in the face of threats of imbalances in the basic conditions for survival such as food production, the environmental quality, natural control of pests and diseases, loses of biodiversity and climate changes. Some recent initiatives at global, regional and local level are pointed and some conceptual (...) trends and deployment strategies advance towards the consolidation of the principles of sustainable development, despite several difficulties for effectively reaching its goals. The trend of gradual changes in the models of developing nations and in the patterns of production and consumption is portrayed objectively, seeking to correlate with principles of environmental economics and green economy, since Cecil Pigou and Stuart Mill principles to recent researches as Kenneth Boulding, Herman Daly, Nicholas Georgescu-Rogen, Franz Capra, Ignacy Sachs, Edgar Morin, beyond others. The ability of the United Nations and governments to intervene in neoliberal logic aiming wider benefit to society and the reduction of the negative effects of market distortions, as striking on the global stage, represents a true redemption of the principles advocated by Cecil Pigou, at the beginning of the last century, both for the global economy and for their effects on environmental and social conflicts, social exclusion resulting from the current economic systems which are not necessary new strategies, principles, or economic formulas, but decision making to tackle the market with seriousness to promote equity, social justice and environmental sustainability, without sacrificing progress and development, as evident in the current discussion of social inclusion and the convergence of individual and collective interests, so far in the development model based on increasing production and consumption, yet with little environmental responsibility. eww140926dxn. (shrink)

The present work was intended originally as a chapter for my January 2006 Ph.D dissertation, but now is essentially a 'working paper.' As is well known, economists make a number of abstract and unrealistic assumptions, such as for example characterising the economic agent as a rational maximiser. The present paper is concerned with assessing the methodological status of every-day common-sense observations in relation to such abstract and unrealistic assumptions. Following Popper and Hume, I propose a theoretical framework in which to (...) understand 'common sense.' I then argue that common-sense acts as a 'guide' assessing the value of theoretical work, that theoretical contributions that are based on premises or arrive at conclusions that diverge to a greater degree should require a higher level of justification, and that any common-sense observation about the real world should be admissable as a starting point for theoretical investigation and elaboration and any successful theory should be accountable to common-sense observations. (shrink)