In this article I examine similarities between the science and ethics of biotechnology on the one hand, and those of alchemy on the other, and show that the understanding of nature and naturalness upon which many contemporary ethical responses to biotechnology are predicated is, in fact, significantly similar to the understanding of nature that was the foundation of the practice of alchemy. In doing so I demonstrate that the ethical issues and social responses that are currently arising from advances in (...) the field of biotechnology are interestingly similar to those that arose in reaction to the practice and prevalence of alchemy from its inception in Europe in the mid-twelfth century until at least the early modern period. I argue that a proper conception of the ethical issues and a sensible interpretation of the power and the promise of the science of biotechnology are most likely if we understand such attitudes to nature, and to the ethical issues surrounding technological and scientific developments, in terms of an historical and cultural continuum. That is, we should regard biotechnology as merely the latest in a string of technological and scientific developments rather than, as is often alleged, as something entirely new, requiring its own special ethical response. Finally, I suggest that examining the parallels between the ethical issues generated by alchemy and by biotechnology show us that such issues are best situated and discussed within a framework of virtue ethics, as it allows us to think seriously about the relationship between art and nature and the proper role of humans in relation to their technology.Keywords: Ethics; Alchemy; Biotechnology; Bioethics; Virtue ethics; Notions of nature. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the twin concepts of 'playing God', and its secular equivalent – that which I term for the purpose of this discussion 'vexing Nature' – as they relate to arguments against certain human technological actions and behaviours. While noting the popular subscription to the notion that certain acts constitute instances of 'playing God' or interfering in the natural order, philosophers often deny that such phrases have any application to the central ethical issues in the areas where (...) they are most commonly applied. I examine, in detail, the interpretations of these phrases put forward by bio-ethicists Ruth Chadwick and John Harris and argue that the concepts 'playing God' and 'vexing nature' are best understood as an expression of a moral intuition that is both significant and deserving of serious philosophical attention. My contention is that intuitions of this kind often express a concern for the virtue of, and doubt about the intentions of, the agent whose acts are described in these terms, and that these concepts are best understood as part of an historical and cultural continuum specific to the Western tradition. Understood as such, this indicates that debate continues over the purpose of art and technology, and the place of humanity within the natural environment, and that a kind of traditional teleological virtue ethics still exerts a significant influence on popular conceptions of the moral issues underlying this debate. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the moral status of agricultural biotechnology and, more specifically, genetically modified crops by employing the hubris argument. The old notion of hubris, given to us by the ancient Greeks, provides a narrative from which we can understand ourselves and technology. Ronald Sandler offers us an understanding of hubris he claims gives us a prima facie reason and a presumption against the use of GM crops. I argue that Sandler’s hubris argument fails for several reasons: Sander (...) and many others fail to have a proper understanding of agriculture as an inherently technological practice which is radically different from ‘nature’; the notions of control and manipulation which are central to the concept of hubris are difficult to understand and use in the context of agriculture; trying to establish a prima facie reason against GM crops runs into serious difficulty since many GM crops are profoundly different from each other; and even if we accept Sandler’s argument of hubris, it actually plays no role in the reasoning and evaluation of the moral status of different GM crops. (shrink)

Poultry production makes a substantial contribution to global food security, providing energy, protein, and essential micro-nutrients to humans. Modern intensive poultry farming systems are challenged by the evolution of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza strains. The presence of avian influenza in poultry flocks poses a significant risk of an avian origin influenza that is easily transmittable between human beings evolving. By reducing contact between humans and fowl, the use of automation in poultry production has the potential to improve biosecurity and thus (...) reduce the risk of pandemic influenza. Many poultry facilities are already highly automated. The rapid rate of progress in robotics and AI suggests that “lights out”—fully automated—poultry production systems may soon be possible. In this paper we consider the ethical and policy issues that would be raised by lights-out poultry production. There is a strong animal and human welfare case for reducing the risk of pandemic influenza via increased use of automation. However, lights-out farming looks to be the ultimate endpoint of dynamics already present in industrial agriculture, which led to the dangers of zoonotic infection from animal agriculture in the first place. Whether nations should respond to that risk by doubling down on industrial models of animal production and embracing fully automated farms or by reconsidering the current model of animal agriculture altogether is, we suggest, both the most important, and the most difficult, question posed by the prospect of lights out farms. (shrink)

The use of genetically modified plants in agriculture (GM crops) is controversially discussed in academic publications. Important issues are whether the release of GM crops is beneficial or harmful for the environment and therefore acceptable, and whether the modification of plants is ethically permissible per se . This study provides a comprehensive overview of the moral reasoning on the use of GM crops expressed in academic publications from 1975 to 2008. Environmental ethical aspects in the publications were investigated. Overall, 113 (...) articles from 15 ecology, environmental ethics, and multidisciplinary science journals were systematically reviewed. Three types of moral concerns were used to structure the normative statements, moral notions, and moral issues found in the articles: concerns addressing consequences of the use of GM crops, concerns addressing the act (the technique itself), and concerns addressing the virtues of an actor. Articles addressing consequences (84%) dealt with general ecological and risk concerns or discussed specific ecological issues about the use of GM crops. Articles addressing the act (57%) dealt with the value of naturalness, the value of biotic entities, and conceptual reductionism, whereas articles addressing the actor (43%) dealt with virtues related to the handling of risks and the application of GM crops. The results of this study may help to structure the academic debate and contribute to a better understanding of moral concerns that are associated with the key aspects of the ethical theories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to further our understanding of the “GM is unnatural” view, and of the critical response to it. While many people have been reported to hold the view that GM is unnatural, many policy-makers and their advisors have suggested that the view must be ignored or rejected, and that there are scientific reasons for doing so. Three “typical” examples of ways in which the “GM is unnatural” view has been treated by UK policy-makers and their (...) advisors are explored. These are the Government’s position (DEFRA Report), the account of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and the position of Nigel Halford, a scientist with an advisory role to the Government. I show that their accounts fail to mount a convincing critique. Then, I draw on an empirical research project held during 2003–2004 at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north east of England. Scientists met with non-scientists in a range of facilitated one-to-one conversations (“exchanges”) on various environmental issues, one of which was on GM. Our findings show that some scientists who rejected the “GM is unnatural” view struggled to do so consistently. Their struggle is interpreted in terms of a conflict between a so-called “scientific” worldview, and a different worldview that underlies the concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view. This worldview is explored further by an examination of their concerns. What distinguishes this worldview from the “scientific” worldview is that the instrumentalization of the nonhuman world is questioned to a larger extent. I conclude that, because the underlying concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view were not with GM as such, yet with a worldview that was considered to be problematic, and of which many GM applications were held to be expressions, policy-makers and their advisors should reflect on the critical worldview of those who claim that GM is unnatural if they want to engage seriously with their concerns. (shrink)