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Proposes a new way of understanding the nature of metaphysics, focusing on nonreductionist emergence theory, both in ancient and modern philosophy, as well as in contemporary philosophy of science. |
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In this paper I argue that Socrates believed that there is no distinction between man's virtue and woman's virtue and that there is no difference in the achievement of virtue between men and women. My analysis shows Plato's position on the moral equality of guardian women and men in the Republic to be a continuation of the Socratic position of nongendered virtue. I thus disagree with Spelman's recent interpretation of the Republic on this issue. |
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Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: a version in which on any given occasion desire, and then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; a version formed by the (...) |
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The first part of the present paper argues against any attempts to find a set of fixed points of a doctrine that could be ascribed to Socrates. The main thesis of the article has it that Socrates was part of a cultural movement that was marked by a tendency to rather raise questions than merely provide answers and boast about having a number of doctrines or doxai of their own. The second part of the paper concentrates on a number of (...) |
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In Archytas of Tarentum, Carl Huffman reconstructs Archytas’ theory of definition by linking definitions to the mathematical study of ratios and proportions. This paper considers whether and how Archytas used definitions and whether he possessed a theory of definition. Our evidence does not support the claim that Archytas has a theory of definition, and his approach to the science of harmonics suggests that he relied on analogies and proportions in the practice of inquiry. We understand sounds and other entities by (...) |
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In this paper we provide an interpretation of Aristotle's rule for the universal quantifier in Topics Θ 157a34–37 and 160b1–6 in terms of Paul Lorenzen's dialogical logic. This is meant as a contribution to the rehabilitation of the role of dialectic within the Organon. After a review of earlier views of Aristotle on quantification, we argue that this rule is related to the dictum de omni in Prior Analytics A 24b28–29. This would be an indication of the dictum’s origin in (...) |
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In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to (...) |
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Este artículo se propone mostrar, en contra de las interpretaciones dominantes, que Platón debió tempranamente postular la supervivencia del alma como un sujeto independiente de daño y beneficio moral con el objeto de completar su defensa de la ética socrática – en particular el principio de Soberanía de la Virtud, central en diálogos tempranos como la Apología, el Critón y el Gorgias. Al dualismo metafísico que resulta de este postulado le denomino ‘dualismo socrático’, para diferenciarlo del dualismo maduro expuesto por (...) |
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