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Defeasibility in Law

In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag. pp. 315-364 (2011)

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  1. Interpretation, Argumentation, and the Determinacy of Law.Giovanni Sartor - 2023 - Ratio Juris 36 (3):214-241.
    This article models legal interpretation through argumentation and provides a logical analysis of interpretive arguments, their conflicts, and the resulting indeterminacies. Interpretive arguments are modelled as defeasible inferences, which can be challenged and defeated by counterarguments and be reinstated through further arguments. It is shown what claims are possibly (defensibly) or necessarily (justifiably) supported by the arguments constructible from a given interpretive basis, i.e., a set of interpretive canons coupled with reasons for their application. It is finally established under what (...)
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  • Modelling last-act attempted crime in criminal law.Jiraporn Pooksook, Phan Minh Dung, Ken Satoh & Giovanni Sartor - 2019 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 29 (4):327-357.
    In the court of law, a person can be punished for attempting to commit a crime. An open issue in the study of Artificial Intelligence and Law is whether the law of attempts could be formally modelled. There are distinct legal rules for determining attempted crime whereas the last-act rule (also called proximity rule) represents the strictest approach. In this paper, we provide a formal model of the last-act rule using structured argumentation.
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  • (1 other version)Defeasible normative reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1391-1428.
    The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations (in analogy to intrinsic and extrinsic utilities). It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Defeasible normative reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 2019 - Synthese:1-38.
    The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations. It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, too, just as iteratively revisable beliefs. Its (...)
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