Starting with the observation that there exist contradictory claims in the literature about the relationship between vitalism and emergentism—be it one of inclusion or, on the contrary, exclusion–, this paper aims at disentangling the vitalism–emergentism knot. To this purpose, after having described a particular form of emergentism, namely Lloyd Morgan’s emergent evolutionism, I develop a conceptual analysis on the basis of a distinction between varieties of monism and pluralism. This analysis allows me to identify and characterize several forms of vitalism (...) and emergentism, and a subsequent comparison between these forms constitutes the occasion for a clarification of the relationship between both doctrines. (shrink)

Emergentism is often misleadingly described as a monolithic “third way” between radical monism and pluralism. In the particular case of biology, for example, emergentism is perceived as a middle course between mechanicism and vitalism. In the present paper I propose to show that the conceptual landscape between monism and pluralism is more complex than this classical picture suggests. On the basis of two successive analyses—distinguishing three forms of tension between monism and pluralism and a distinction between derivational and functional reduction—I (...) define three different versions of emergentism that can be considered as consistent middle courses between monism and pluralism . I then emphasise the advantage of this taxonomy of the concepts of emergence by applying the results of my analysis to the historical controversy that pertains to the relationship between life and matter. (shrink)

We open this paper by explicating the content of « Laplace’s myth », which we construe as an inference resting on the conjunction of two premises, the hypothesis of an unlimited intelligence and the hypothesis of an ontologically deterministic universe, and leading to the thesis of epistemological determinism. We then aim at showing that such an inference is not valid. To this purpose, we seek for a particular metaphysical framework within which it is possible to hold the conjunction of the (...) premises of the Laplacean inference together with the negation of its conclusion. In particular, after having assessed – and then discarded – the possibility that Bergsonism be a suitable framework to this effect, we show that a specific philosophy of evolution, which has been influenced by – but also took its distance with regard to – Bergsonism, turns out to be the required framework. Emphasising the existence as well as the very consistence of this philosophy is the occasion for putting an end to Laplace’s myth. (shrink)