Climate change can be construed as a question of collective responsibility from two different viewpoints: climate change being inherently a collective problem, or collective entities bearing responsibility for climate change. When discussing collective responsibility for climate change, “collective” can thus refer to the problem of climate change itself, or to the entity causing the harm and/or bearing responsibility for it. The first viewpoint focuses on how climate change is a harm that has been caused collectively. Collective action problem refers to (...) an aggregation of individual actions which together produce an outcome that is not intended at the level of an individual action. It cannot be solved by any one agent acting unilaterally. Instead, climate change action must be enacted and supported by numerous agents. The second way to conceptualize climate change as a question of collective responsibility focuses on the collective entities that bear responsibility for climate change. As a global problem, climate change is linked to the realm of international politics, where states, governments, and intergovernmental organizations are the main collective entities. Other important agential collectives in terms of climate responsibility are corporations, including carbon majors who have produced the bulk of emissions. Climate change has also been theorized as a structural injustice, which combines elements from both the viewpoints on what is collective about responsibility for climate change. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

How should political leaders address the emerging climate crisis if citizens are reluctant to accept costly but necessary climate action? In this article, I address this question by harnessing insights from the realist tradition in political theory. I propose that the realist legitimacy framework provides action guidance by offering two broadly applicable heuristics for political agents: responsibility and responsiveness. These heuristics collide if citizens are unwilling to accept policies designed to secure a nation's long-term stability. Faced with this problem, some (...) authors make the supposedly realist argument that policymakers in liberal democracies should prioritise responsibility over responsiveness and embrace eco-authoritarianism to address the climate emergency. Against this line of argument, I maintain that the realist legitimacy framework entails no such commitment. Instead, realists must emphasise that responsible climate action entails a sufficient degree of responsiveness. I conclude by sketching how this insight may guide democratic leaders and climate activists in the future. (shrink)

The potential upscaling of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies to meet states’ net-zero targets may enable individuals to remove emissions by purchasing carbon removal certificates. In this paper, I argue for two concepts of individual responsibility to capture the moral responsibility of individuals to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through CDR technologies. The first is that of liability, a direct responsibility to remove carbon in order to minimize one’s carbon footprint. The second is a shared political responsibility to remove (...) carbon that individuals have by virtue of being part of weak collectives responsible for mitigating climate change or by virtue of participating in structures that contribute to climate change. I argue that the concept of shared political responsibility can be used to determine how CDR technologies should or should not be implemented. Finally, I discuss how these two responsibilities are related. (shrink)

If the state outsources a responsibility to private actors to plant trees, is that necessarily a bad thing? Surely, one would think not. Still, in constitutional theory, there are many forceful arguments against privatisation. One of the core arguments against privatisation is the question of who ought to do what and what it means for a policy area to be inherently public. In this paper, I am interested in varieties of privatisation and in particular what privatisation means in the context (...) of climate change. The aim of the paper is to show that precisely because there is a variety of privatisation, in some areas, such as the environment and regarding climate change, we may discuss the question of ‘duty’ rather than privatisation as such. (shrink)

The paper offers a normative analysis of the new Loss & Damage Fund supporting vulnerable countries grappling with climate change-related harms. This fund is primarily financed by affluent nations, often identified as historical polluters. However, the perspective of relational egalitarianism highlights persistent structural injustices in the background of the fund. Addressing them necessitates conceptualizing the fund not merely as an act of cooperative solidarity but as compensation for the consequences of historical and ongoing structural injustices. Properly conceived, the fund manages (...) adverse climate effects and simultaneously tackles their underlying root causes, including the unjust distribution of advantages and power. (shrink)

Ray and Cooper (2024) argue for the need to incorporate the fight for environmental justice into the bioethics agenda. While they convincingly argue that the principle of justice involves environme...

In this article we argue that duties towards future generations are situated on the collective level and that they should be understood in terms of collective responsibility for structural injustice. In the context of climate change, it seems self‐evident that our moral duties pertain not only to the current generation but to future generations as well. However, conceptualizing this leads to the non‐identity problem: future persons cannot be harmed by present‐day choices because they would not have existed if other choices (...) had been made. Recently, Charlotte Franziska Unruh has proposed a solution that places the duties not on the individual level but on the collective level. The current generation has a responsibility for future generations as a whole. This solution is promising, but we argue that it problematically overlooks the existence of unjust relations within the contemporary collective, as we all contribute differently to bringing future generations into existence. Therefore, we propose to graft Iris Marion Young's Social Connection Model, which is concerned with structural injustice, on to the discussion of responsibility for future generations. Our proposal incorporates the strengths of Unruh's arguments, while also allowing for a differentiated responsibility based on different implications in unjust structures. (shrink)

In this article we address the so-called argument of «individual causal inefficacy» (ICI), according to which CO2-emission-generating actions are morally neutral with regards to climate change, in so far as, taken in their singularity, they are neither sufficient nor necessary to cause climate change. In the first part, we address the main substantive objection to ICI: if a single emission, analysed in isolation, does not cause any disutility, it is impossible to explain why climate change (which is the result of (...) a sum of emissions) is the source of an enormous disutility; thus, ICI should be rejected in so far as it leads to a conclusion that is logically inconsistent. We argue, contrary to this, that it is possible to hold together ICI and individual moral responsibility for climate change, given the characteristics of the natural carbon cycle and of net-zero emissions. In the second part, accordingly, we propose a theory of individual responsibility for climate change which is based on the distinction between individual and collective freedom to emit, compatibly with a given mitigation target. This theory allows us to maintain that there exists a moral duty to reduce individual emissions, without having to demonstrate the fallacy of ICI. This duty is based on distributive reasons, which can prescind from the direct causal relationship between individual polluting actions and climate damage. (shrink)