Zeno’s arrow does not move “in the now” (Phys. VI 8, 239b2) or, equivalently, “in the place it is” (DK 29 B 4). Zeno concludes from this that the arrow does not move at all. In Aristotle (ibid. 9, 239b5–9, 31–33), Zeno’s argument takes the form of an invalid inference from instants to periods of time. Insofar as it fails to bring out an inconsistency in Aristotle’s account of motion, the paradox is thus eliminated. That instantaneous motion is a contradiction (...) in terms belongs to the common ground Aristotle shares with Zeno. That’s why information concerning Zeno’s relevant argument must be sought elsewhere (see section 3). Aristotle’s discussion of the Arrow pertains to the conclusions drawn from the denial of instantaneous motion. But the argument he refutes is of his own making, or so I will argue (section 2). In particular, Aristotle fails to address the presentist commitment adumbrated in his account, which would leave nothing beyond the denial of instantaneous motion for Zeno to prove. Presentism is no option in Phys. VI where a tenseless account of time and motion is offered. I will argue that Aristotle’s account of the tenses in De interpretatione is prone to Zeno’s argument if the present is conceived as an instant – which it arguably is not (section 4). (shrink)

When do things change? When do things have some characteristics? I try to answer these questions by looking at different solutions Plato and Aristotle presented in their works. The famous analysis of change from the second half of Plato’s Parmenides claims that change happens outside of time, at an “instant”. On the contrary, Aristotle in the Physics explicitly argues that all change occurs only in time. However, both Plato and Aristotle also provide other analyses of change. How to deal with (...) this variety of explanations and tensions between them? In this paper, I argue that if we differentiate between several kinds of change, most of Plato’s and Aristotle’s analyses provide a thorough insight into the nature of change. For processes such as locomotion, change occurs exclusively within time. For changes where both the initial and final states occur only in time, such as a transition from motion to rest, change takes place in the ‘now’. However, for changes where both the initial and final states occur in both time and in the ‘now’ – for example, a qualitative change from being white to not being white – change does not occur in time nor in the ‘now’, but instead happens instantaneously. (shrink)

Résumé Après quelques remarques préliminaires sur l’emploi par Platon de l’adverbe nun, j’explore la nature du nun à travers une lecture approfondie du passage où la notion est spécifiquement examinée (Parm. 151e3–153b7). Sa nature metaxu, située entre la durée et la limite, conduit à examiner l’autre notion temporelle de la deuxième partie du Parménide qui est metaxu, c’est-à-dire l’exaiphnês. J’explique pourquoi le nun et l’exaiphnês doivent être distingués et pourquoi il n’existe pas de modèle où les deux notions s’inscrivent simultanément, (...) mais plutôt un modèle rendant compte d’un saut et un modèle rendant compte d’un changement continu. (shrink)