In Critique of Pure Reason Kant speaks about motion, as action of the subject in connection with the actions by which we describe a space, such as drawing a line or constructing a circle. In a 1992-paper in Kant-Studien I argued that this is one important piece of textual evidence for the so-called externalist interpretation, according to which the transcendental conditions of experience and indeed all the a priori elements in Kant’s system are public, depending upon overt action. Konstantin Pollok (...) has criticized my reading, arguing that the relevant use of the term “motion” here is just metaphorical, and considering some central Kantian doctrines that he thinks refutes the externalist interpretation. The present paper defends the externalist interpretation against Pollok’s charges. (shrink)

The externalist interpretation of Kant allows for a ratumal reconstruction of what is fundamental to transcendental idealism: action. Kant resorts to action several times in the Critique of Pure Reason. The very notion of "synthesis," which plays a vital role in his philosophy, is presented as a Handlung. The externalist interpretation endeavours to expiam what Kant means by action in those contexts so as to make philosophical sense of Kant's thought and at the same time to prevent it from being (...) turned into a flawed internalism. Whereas internalism struggles to present synthesis as a mental act that is as private as thinking quietly, or even as an unconscious activity, externalism shows that, according to Kant, human knowledge depends on the ability to carry out observable actions that involve human body in a very particular way. In this article, externalism will be vindiicated in relaticm to (1) the foundations of Kant's conception of figurative synthesis of transcendental imagmation, and (2) the nature of transcendental esquemata in his critical speculative philosophy. (shrink)