ABSTRACTI argue that the degree to which a criminal should be punished is determined by three elements: a baseline amount that proportionally compensates the victim and an additional penalty that, first, reforms the criminal and, second, deters others from becoming unjust. My interpretation provides a solution to the interpretive puzzle that has most vexed commentators: the alleged tension between Plato's philosophical theory of punishment and the content of his penal code. I defend a two-step solution to the puzzle. First, on (...) my interpretation, because of the broad role that deterrence must play, this alleged tension is—to a degree—merely apparent. Second, the actual tension can be explained by Plato's commitment to the rule of law, given the epistemic limitations of actual people. (shrink)

Lycurgus' "Against Leocrates" has long been seen as an anomaly in the oratorical corpus by scholars of ancient rhetoric. Its extensive use of quotations from the poets and of personification are two features regularly picked out as especially odd and inexplicable by critics. This paper argues that these and other features of the speech are central to Lycurgus' attempt to persuade his jury to accept his radically un-Athenian political views. In fact, Lycurgus has rejected Athenian approaches to punishment, prosecution, and (...) politics in favor of Platonic views, which bear the taint of the elite philosophical schools. The quotation and the personification are two techniques that Lycurgus uses to craft a "new prosecutorial voice" that will overcome his audience's objections to his elitist and even Platonic political positions. I contend that the whole speech may be read as a study in how to craft a "voice" or form of oratorical self-presentation that will persuade an audience to accept heterodox political views. (shrink)

À la fin du ve siècle avant Jésus-Christ, apparaît dans la littérature grecque un certain nombre de discours impies. Platon en fait l’inventaire dans les Lois. Parmi les critiques adressées à la religion traditionnelle, l’une figure en bonne place chez Euripide : puisque les hommes injustes n’ont, dans les faits, guère à pâtir de leur conduite, il est légitime de mettre en doute l’existence des dieux. Or une autre thèse, voisine dans son vocabulaire mais conceptuellement distincte, se fait jour à (...) la faveur de la première : l’irrespect de la loi et son affaiblissement entraînent une perte de confiance dans les dieux, car ces derniers sont une partie même du nomos. La réponse sophistique et même platonicienne à ce constat propose d’inverser les termes du problème : il faudrait pouvoir renforcer le tout par la partie, le nomos par la croyance aux dieux, les deux étant des faits institutionnels produits par le ou les législateurs. L’article examine comment cette suggestion se trouve développée, avec des variations, par Protagoras, Critias et l’Étranger d’Athènes au livre X des Lois. (shrink)