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  1. Science, sentience, and animal welfare.Robert C. Jones - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (1):1-30.
    I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuman animals, highlighting their biological/physiological aspects. I then survey the most prominent empirical research on the physiological and cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, focusing primarily on sentience, but looking also at a few other morally relevant capacities such as self-awareness, memory, and mindreading. Lastly, I discuss two examples of current animal welfare policy, namely, animals used in industrialized food production and in scientific research. I argue (...)
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  • Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe.Juliane Kaminski, Josep Call & Michael Tomasello - 2008 - Cognition 109 (2):224-234.
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  • Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom: Philosophical Controversies.Anna Dutkowska & Zbigniew Wróblewski - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (3):101-122.
    The central issue in the debate on animal minds is the issue of mindreading. This complicated cognitive ability belongs to the key elements of social cognition — as a form of adapting to specific circumstances connected with living in groups, it enables the reading of the mental states of other individuals, e.g. intentions, desires, and beliefs as well as the adaptation of one’s own behavior to this information. The primary purpose of the article is to present the main philosophical controversies (...)
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  • Contrasting the Social Cognition of Humans and Nonhuman Apes: The Shared Intentionality Hypothesis.Josep Call - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):368-379.
    Joint activities are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, but they differ substantially in their underlying psychological states. Humans attribute and share mental states with others in the so‐called shared intentionality. Our hypothesis is that our closest nonhuman living relatives also attribute some psychological mechanisms such as perceptions and goals to others, but, unlike humans, they are not necessarily intrinsically motivated to share those psychological states. Furthermore, it is postulated that shared intentionality is responsible for the appearance of a suite of (...)
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