In this paper, a case study is presented of constitutional debates about abortion. An analysis is given of arguments from the Roe v. Wade case for definitions concerning the key notions of `person' and `human life'. The paper illustrates how the Court has gradually taken a more pragmatic or rhetorical position on definitional matters crucial to the purpose of regulating abortion.

I characterize the deductivist ideal of justification and, following to a great extent Toulmin’s work The Uses of Argument, I try to explain why this ideal is erroneous. Then I offer an alternative model of justification capable of making our claims to knowledge about substantial matters sound and reasonable. This model of justification will be based on a conception of justification as the result of good argumentation, and on a model of argumentation which is a pragmatic linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin’s (...) model of argument. (shrink)

Skinner has been criticized for advancing essentialist interpretations of meaning in which meaning is treated as the property of a word or a grammatical form. Such a practice is consistent with a "words and things" view that sought to advance an ideal language as well as with S-R views that presented meaning as the property of a word form. These views imply an essentialist theory of meaning that would be consistent with Skinner's early S-R behaviorism. However, Skinner's more developed account (...) of meaning is based on his later selectionist behaviorism, and this account of meaning is aligned in many respects with the views of Darwin, Peirce, F. C. S. Schiller, Dewey, and Wittgenstein. After adopting a selectionist theory of meaning, it was inconsistent for Skinner to maintain essentialist practices although Skinner did so in response to influences that had little to do with his selectionist theory. Skinner's particular contribution to this pragmatic-selectionist tradition of meaning is the integration of meaning within his three-term contingency for operant behavior. In this account, meaning lies in the probabilistic functional relations of verbal behavior rather than in its form. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown how certain defeasible argumentation schemes can be used to represent the logical structure of the most common types of argument used for statutory interpretation both in civil and common law. The method is based on an argumentation structure in which the conclusion, namely, the meaning attributed to a legal source, is modeled as a claim that needs that is be supported by pro and con defeasible arguments. The defeasible nature of each scheme is shown (...) by means of critical questions, which identify the default conditions for the accepting interpretative arguments and provide a method for evaluating a given argument as weak or strong. (shrink)

As the world has increasingly embraced globalization, temptations to encroach on traditional boundaries of state sovereignty for reasons of self-interest mount. Argumentation studies provide an important lens for examining the public discourse used to justify such moves. This essay examines the Bush administration’s strategic use of the definitional processes of association and dissociation to build its public case for regime change in Afghanistan. After exploring how the Bush administration’s early rhetoric after 9/11 failed to actually provide the Taliban a choice (...) to remain in power, the essay reveals three combinations of the terrorism/state relationship that functioned as an argument by definition to gain support for the US campaign to overthrow the regime. (shrink)

Within the framework of pragma-dialectics, this paper analyzes the use of dissociations in the spokespersons’ replies at the press conferences held by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2015 and 2017. As shown in the research results, to cut down the authority of their opponents in criticizing China and to convince the international general public of the Chinese standpoints, four subtypes of dissociation are used, which can be differentiated as: “distorted” Term I versus “authentic” Term II, “ambiguous” Term I (...) versus “univocal” Term II, “broadened” Term I versus “exact” Term II, and “narrowed” Term I versus “exact” Term II. The strategic maneuvering carried out by the spokespersons in confronting their immediate opponents by means of the various subtypes of dissociation is in the first place directed at their primary audience, i.e. the international general public. To make a convincing case, in using dissociations the spokespersons not only adapt in their strategic maneuvering to the demands of their primary audience but also in their selection from the topical potential and the presentational devices. (shrink)

Conceptual Engineering, the practice of stipulating a change in the meaning of a word in order to improve it in some fashion, for some end, has proved a popular topic among philosophers of language in recent times. Deutsch (Philos Stud 177:3935–3957, 2020) has argued that it has received an undue degree of interest since its implementation falls onto one of the horns of a dilemma: either the change to be effected is in the global semantic meaning of the given word/concept, (...) in which case it is infeasible, or it is merely in the local speaker-meaning, in which case it is largely trivial. I suggest, however, that there is a deeper, more troubling, objection to Conceptual Engineering. My criticism does not strictly take the form of a dilemma, since some cases may fall upon both horns at once and others may be able to squeeze through the gap, but it does involve highlighting two potential weaknesses of the project: one of those, as with Deutsch, is the danger of triviality, although it is not concerned only with the division between semantic and speaker meaning. It seems clear that there are cases where a particular authority or legislature has the capacity to alter a word’s legal meaning; others where certain groups may discuss the best way to use a technical term, each putting forward their preferred suggestions; and individual speakers are at liberty to choose to use a word with a particular intention. None of this is new, nor controversial, and, thus, is largely trivial. In all cases, but particularly where meanings are manipulated without due authority, inexplicitly, or in order to further a particular theoretical conception, however, there is a strong chance that the engineer will be led to commit one of the fallacies of language to which philosophy is particularly vulnerable (Hinton Evaluating the language of argument, Springer, Cham, 2021). These include fallacies of vagueness, equivocation, and persuasive definition. In this paper, I use examples to illustrate the likely fallaciousness of conceptual redefinitions and highlight in particular the ‘Philosophical Fallacy’, outlined by Nelson (A theory of philosophical fallacies.Translated by Leal F, Carus D. Springer, Cham 2016). I conclude that, as a method for philosophers, Conceptual Engineering is, in broad terms, either trivial or fallacious. (shrink)

In Denmark political commentary is still a relatively new phenomenon. This paper analyzes the metadiscourse in relation to political commentary to identify the different understandings that have coalesced around political commentary as a genre. I argue that people in different positions emphasize different explanations for the rise of the genre and thereby functions of political commentary as part of an argumentative strategy favouring their own interests.