Anne Conway argues that all substances are spiritual. Yet, she also claims that all created substance has some type of body. Peter Loptson has argued that Conway didn’t carefully consider her view that all created beings have bodies for it seems God could have created only disembodied spirits. There are several reasons to think Loptson is right. First, Conway holds that God is all‐good and will do the best for his creation. She also holds that spirit is better than body. (...) So, how is it that creatures always have bodies? Second, although she maintains that incorporation is punishment for sin, Conway holds that some creatures can fall without acquiring visible corporality. I argue that when we examine these views more closely, we will see that not only did Conway give them careful consideration, but that there is no inconsistency. Finally, I show that Conway’s views concerning the nature and function of body provides further evidence of her carefully crafted system. Conway holds that bodies play an important role in a finite beings’ ability to change and interact with others. Even more surprising is Conway’s view that the body is the repository of thoughts, memories, and knowledge. (shrink)

This paper looks at selected reviews of women’s philosophical (and literary) works by Revolutionary author and politician Pierre-Louis Roederer. This study occasions the following remarks. Women’s works, when they raised political radical and sometimes feminist agendas were not only read and reviewed, but considered part of the general Revolutionary effort to relieve social and political inequalities. Secondly Roederer appears, from these reviews, as committed to convincing the French intellectual community that works by women ought to be taken as seriously as (...) works by men, and to combat the prejudices which meant that they often were not. I will highlight in particular his reading of Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman as both a fictionalized continuation of the philosophical programme of her Vindication of the Rights of Woman, and as a contribution to the philosophy of emotions – for which he compares it to Sophie de Grouchy’s Letters on Sympathy. I will also look at an unpublished draft in which he compares and contrasts Grouchy, Germaine de Staël, Emilie du Chatelet and Suzanne Necker’s writings on love. (shrink)