The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness. In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures are introduced: comparative versus numeric t-measures, t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthlikeness are explicated and developed within a version of conjunctive part accounts based on content elements. The focus lies on measures of probabilistic truthlikeness, that are divided into t-measures for statistical probabilities and single (...) case probabilities. The logical notion of probabilistic truthlikeness can be treated as a subcase of deterministic truthlikeness for quantitative theories. In contrast, the epistemic notion of probabilistic truthlikeness creates genuinely new problems, especially for hypotheses about single case probabilities that are evaluated not by comparison to observed frequencies, but by comparison to the truth values of single event statements. By the method of meta-induction, competing theories about single case probabilities can be aggregated into a combined theory with optimal predictive success and epistemic truthlikeness. (shrink)

This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.