This essay examines Claudia Card's notion of misplaced gratitude, which she explores in one of her last papers, “Gratitude to the Decent Rescuer.” Whereas typically philosophers have been interested in the problems of the failures to honor obligations of gratitude, Card is more interested in the opposite fault of misplaced gratitude. Her interest reflects her social indignation and her fundamental commitment to opposing oppression, exploitation, and injustice in all its forms. The phenomenon of misplaced gratitude becomes visible from this perspective, (...) where one catches sight of what oppression does to people. The essay looks at the question, What does Card's analysis of misplaced gratitude tell us about her own philosophical methods and contributions? It discusses her engagement with both care ethics and Beauvoir's phenomenology of oppression to clarify the centrality of misplaced gratitude for Card's work in developing an ethics of oppression. (shrink)

We bring the distinct and complementary existentialist perspectives of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir to bear on the phenomenon of moral disengagement in managerial decision-making. Existentialist thinking is a rich source of insight on this phenomenon, because—as we demonstrate—the concept of moral disengagement overlaps significantly with the notion of ‘a consciousness in bad faith’ in Sartre’s writing, and the notion of ‘not willing oneself free’ in De Beauvoir’s writing. These concepts play a critical role in existentialist ethics, and thus (...) existentialists carefully deliberated the phenomenon that these concepts aim to illuminate. Rather than being motivated by self-interest as implied by the bulk of extant empirical work on moral disengagement, existentialist perspectives suggest that moral disengagement can instead be motivated by an overwhelming sense of responsibility towards diverse others. From an existentialist perspective, the temptation to morally disengage will not only be felt by individuals that have a strong, trait-like propensity for moral disengagement, but by managers in general. This temptation is likely to be felt in the specific context of right vs. right dilemmas, which have up to now rarely been studied by moral disengagement scholars. Even though existentialist thought paints the problem of moral disengagement as more widespread and entrenched in the human condition, it also suggests ways of preventing moral disengagement. In arguing for these preventative approaches, we make careful distinctions between Sartre and De Beauvoir, thereby becoming the first to argue that De Beauvoir offers a unique contribution to our understanding of ethical decision-making in management. (shrink)

Simone de Beauvoir held that human experience is intrinsically ambiguous and that there are no values extrinsic to experience, but she also designated some actions as absolute evil. This essay explains how Beauvoir utilized an intrinsic absolute value to ground an action-guiding principle of freedom that justifies her notion of evil. Morgan's analysis counters Robin May Schott's objections that Beauvoir failed to systematically justify her notion of absolute evil and that Beauvoir shifted from a “logic of action” to a “logic (...) of history” when she utilized the concept. (shrink)

Simone de Beauvoir incorporates a significantly altered form of the Hegelian master/slave dialectic into "The Ethics of Ambiguity." Her ethical theory explains and denounces extreme wrongdoing, such as the mass murder of millions of Jews at the hands of the Nazis. This essay demonstrates that, in the Beauvoirean dialectic, the Nazi value system (and Hitler) was the master, Adolf Eichmann was a slave, and Jews were denied human status. The analysis counters Robin May Schott's claims that "Beauvoir portrays the attitudes (...) of the oppressor as defined fundamentally in relation to the oppressed" and that her use of the dialectic is "inadequate to account for how human beings create extreme situations of evil, such as that of genocide.". (shrink)

This article discusses the trajectory of Simone de Beauvoir’s concern with the issue of torture. It argues that Beauvoir’s interest in torture extends back at least to World War II and that her activities and writings against torture during the French-Algerian War of 1954–1962 were pivotal in prompting her to reject ethical philosophical language and to embrace, in its place, a new concept of politics based on need. It further suggests that exploring the development of Beauvoir’s ideas about torture helps (...) elucidate her belated turn to feminism and that in Beauvoir’s disarray and disillusionment regarding the use of torture by the French during the French-Algerian War and her compatriots’ complaisance with regard to this, there are lessons of sorts, though not necessarily entirely comforting ones, for Americans and others facing similar situations. (shrink)