Islamic building codes require mosques to face Mecca. The further Islam spreads, the more apt are believers to fall into a quandary. X faces Y only when the front of X is closer to Y than any other side of X. So the front of the mosque should be oriented along a shortest path to Mecca. Which way is that? Does the path to Mecca tunnel through the earth? Or does the path follow the surface of the earth?

En los últimos años, el interés por la semántica de términos ficticios ha crecido considerablemente en el marco de la tradición analítica. De forma general, es posible distinguir dos grandes tipos de propuestas semánticas: las propuestas ontológicamente comprometidas con entidades ficticias y las que evitan dicho compromiso . Entre estas últimas, se destaca la propuesta inscripcionalista de Nelson Goodman y Catherine Elgin, que constituye el eje de análisis del presente artículo. Su objetivo principal es mostrar algunas de las ventajas de (...) la propuesta inscripcionalista frente a las propuestas realistas. En la segunda sección, analizo algunas de las dificultades que conllevan las propuestas realistas y luego muestro que estas no tienen lugar en la propuesta de Goodman y Elgin. En la tercera sección, presento la propuesta inscripcionalista, centrándome en su ampliación, la noción de referencia y sus diversas modalidades, y también analizo una serie de enunciados problemáticos utilizando los modos referenciales anteriormente presentados. (shrink)

Metaphors are expressions in artificial, contrived, alien languages, and we understand metaphors by constructing translation schemes linking our natural, literal languages to these theoretically contrived metaphorical languages. The relation between a literal natural language and a metaphorical contrived language is like the relationship between a natively known language and a system of subsequently acquired languages etymologically emerging from that basic natural language. This model for understanding metaphorically contrived language is kin to the familiar model explaining how speakers of a language (...) such as Latin may come to decipher a language like Spanish through projecting to Spanish what they know of Latin without the aid of a translation manual. A metaphor is, thus, seen as a sentence in a nonnatural language, itself derived from and at least partially translatable with the natural, literal language of the metaphor's author or audience. (shrink)

The problem addressed is that of finding a sound characterization of ambiguity. Two kinds of characterizations are distinguished: tests and definitions. Various definitions of ambiguity are critically examined and contrasted with definitions of generality and indeterminacy, concepts with which ambiguity is sometimes confused. One definition of ambiguity is defended as being more theoretically adequate than others which have been suggested by both philosophers and linguists. It is also shown how this definition of ambiguity obviates a problem thought to be posed (...) by ambiguity for truth theoretical semantics. In addition, the best known test for ambiguity, namely the test by contradiction, is set out, its limitations discussed, and its connection with ambiguity's definition explained. The test is contrasted with a test for vagueness first proposed by Peirce and a test for generality propounded by Margalit. (shrink)

The Logocratic Method, and the Logocratic theory that underwrites it, provide a philosophical explanation of three purposes or goals that arguers have for their arguments: to make arguments that are internally strong, or that are dialectically strong, or that are rhetorically strong. This article presents the basic terms and methods of Logocratic analysis and then uses a case study to illustrate the Logocratic explanation of arguments. Highlights of this explanation are: the use of a virtue framework to explicate the three (...) strengths and weaknesses of arguments that are of greatest interest to arguers in many contexts, the Logocratic explication of the structure of abduction generally and of legal abduction specifically, the concept of a system of arguments, and the concept of the dynamic interactive virtue of arguments—a property of systems of arguments in which the system of arguments as a whole is as virtuous as are the component arguments that comprise the system. This is especially important since, according to Logocratic theory, some arguments, such as abduction and analogical argument, are themselves comprised of different logical forms. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism contains a disquieting and devastating diagnosis about our world. This paper aims to discuss the political- philosophical assumptions underlying the crisis identified by Arendt in her work. It will center its attention on Arendt’s book on Imperialism and her view of the nation- state. An indirect and genetic comprehension path will be drawn, starting with the Arendtian criticism regarding the human rights concept in effect to date, in a kind of prolegomenon both to Arendt’s (...) assessment of Human Rights and to her own proposal of a human right. It will be contended that the individual was freed from his humanness viewed as a universal way of being by way of the nation-state and the Imperialism that followed it. It will be shown that, as a result of this emancipatory movement, the positivity of right was abrogated, simultaneously abrogating the individual’s bond to the human community, thus constituting humanness as a problem. (shrink)

Autor razmatra i kritizira dva argumenta iz višesmislice: S. Pinkerov argument iz višesmislice za hipotezu takozvanoga ‘jezika misli’ i argument iz višesmislice protiv davidsonovske ‘semantike istinosnih uvjeta’ što ga je predložila K. P. Parsons. Oslanjajući se uglavnom na G. Harmana i D. Davidsona, on nastoji pokazati da Pinker/Parsons argumenti dijele jednu zajedničku strategiju i također impliciraju i/ilisugeriraju jedan, po njegovu sudu neprihvatljiv, pojam višesmislice. Raspravljajući o Pinkerovu argumentu, on nastoji objasniti na koji su način razlike u tumačenju višesmislice reflektirane u (...) promjenama javnih i svima dostupnih aspekata uporabe jezika. U diskusiji pak o argumentu protiv ‘semantike istinosnih uvjeta’ on, contra Parsons,nastoji objasniti u kojem je smislu moguće govoriti o istinosnim uvjetima za višesmislice, a da to ne znači prijetnju Davidsonovom pristupu teoriji značenja. Autor, na koncu, brani teoriju višesmislice kao jednoga vida neznanja/neodlučivosti i tvrdi da ta teorija predstavlja i plauzibilniju i realističniju teorijsku opciju od one nakojoj su Pinker i Parsons temeljili svoje argumente, a koju nalazimo i kod Aristotela , K. Bacha ili W. Lycana.The author explores and criticises two arguments from ambiguity: S.Pinker’s argument from ambiguity in support of the ‘Language of Thought’ hypothesis, and the argument from ambiguity proposed by K. P. Parsons against Davidsonian ‘semantics of truth-conditions’. Leaning primarily on G. Harman and D. Davidson he aims to demonstrate that the Pinker/Parsons arguments share a common strategy, on the one hand, and imply and/or suggest, as he claims, an implausible view of ambiguity, on the other. Discussing Pinker’s argument he further attempts to elucidate the ways in which the modifications of public and inter-subjectively accessible aspectsof the use of language reflect the differences in interpretations of an ambiguity. His exploration of the argument against ‘semantics of truth-conditions’ then aims to explain, contra Parsons, the sense in which talk about the truth conditions for ambiguity does not implicate a threat to Davidson’s perspective on the theory of meaning. Finally, the author argues for the view of ambiguity as a kind of ignorance/undecidability that, as he contends, represents both more realistic and more plausible theoretical option than the one on which both Pinker and Parsons found their arguments and which also comes out in Aristotle , K. Bach and W. Lycan. (shrink)

Rorty goes on to connect the sorites paradox to analytic philosophy’s long standing concern with the correspondence theory of truth. How do our words hook up with reality? Do our categories map pre-existing contours? The nominalist answers that “facts” are just projections of our forms of speech. Rorty characterizes epistemicism as a hyper-realist backlash. In addition to thinking that our scientific terminology cuts nature at the joint, the epistemicist asserts that even the vague vocabulary of common sense has sharp thresholds.

Nelson Goodman's proposal for a reconception of meaning consists in replacing the absolute notion ofsameness of meaning by that oflikeness of meaning (with respect to pertinent contexts). According to this view, synonymy is a matter of degree (of interreplaceability) with identity of expression as a limiting case. Goodman's demonstration that no two expressions are exactly alike in meaning is shown to be unsuccessful. Although it does not make use of quotational contexts for the test of interreplaceability, it is tantamount to (...) their acceptance. Goodman rejects quotational contexts; I argue that they should be accepted. This move offers two advantages.Firstly, and mainly, it allows interlinguistic comparison of meaning, something that has not been deemed possible in the received version of Goodman's account.Secondly, it restores the full scale of likeness of meaning damaged by the renunciation of those contexts that guarantee difference in meaning for diverse expressions. (shrink)

On the epistemic view of vagueness, a vague expression has sharp boundaries whose location speakers of the language cannot recognize. The paper argues that one of the deepest sources of resistance to the epistemic view is the idea that all truths are cognitively accessible from truths in a language for natural science, conceived as precise, in a sense explained. The implications of the epistemic view for issues about the relations between vague predicates and scientific predicates are investigated.

This paper reexamines an early article by Noam Chomsky and Israel Scheffler concerning the proper formulation and status of Quine's criterion for ontological commitment. ( What is Said to Be,' "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society", 69, 1958-59; reprinted in Scheffler, "Inquiries".) Somewhat different formulations of the criterion are proposed and their implications explored. It is also argued that Chomsky and Scheffler's views may be seen to foreshadow and lead to some of Quine's later more radical doctrines regarding ontological commitment.

A theory of Goodman and Elgin concerning the individuation of literary works is examined and criticized. An alternative account is offered to meet various of the difficulties in their proposal. In addition, it is suggested that there may not be asingle account of the notion of a literary work that can best do all the jobs we expect of it.