In recent years an increasing number of political philosophers have begun to ground their arguments in empirical evidence. I investigate this novel approach by way of example. The object of my case study is David Miller’s renewed empirical argument for a needs-based principle of justice. First, I introduce Miller’s argument. Then I raise four worries about the application of his methodology that give rise to corresponding general recommendations for how to do empirical political philosophy. Proponents of this approach should take (...) care to (1) check for inappropriately narrow (and broad) samples, (2) verify studies’ relevance for their empirical hypotheses, (3) adjust their confidence to the available empirical evidence, and (4) properly integrate their hypotheses into their philosophical theorizing. (shrink)

When someone hosts a party, when governments choose an aid program, or when assistive robots decide what meal to serve to a family, decision‐makers must determine how to help even when their recipients have very different preferences. Which combination of people’s desires should a decision‐maker serve? To provide a potential answer, we turned to psychology: What do people think is best when multiple people have different utilities over options? We developed a quantitative model of what people consider desirable behavior, characterizing (...) participants’ preferences by inferring which combination of “metrics” (maximax, maxsum, maximin, or inequality aversion [IA]) best explained participants’ decisions in a drink‐choosing task. We found that participants’ behavior was best described by the maximin metric, describing the desire to maximize the happiness of the worst‐off person, though participant behavior was also consistent with maximizing group utility (the maxsum metric) and the IA metric to a lesser extent. Participant behavior was consistent across variation in the agents involved and tended to become more maxsum‐oriented when participants were told they were players in the task (Experiment 1). In later experiments, participants maintained maximin behavior across multi‐step tasks rather than shortsightedly focusing on the individual steps therein (Experiment 2, Experiment 3). By repeatedly asking participants what choices they would hope for in an optimal, just decision‐maker, and carefully disambiguating which quantitative metrics describe these nuanced choices, we help constrain the space of what behavior we desire in leaders, artificial intelligence systems helping decision‐makers, and the assistive robots and decision‐makers of the future. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop a framework for distributing risks. Based on a distinction between risks with reversible losses and risks with irreversible losses, I defend the following composite allocation principle: first, irreversible risks should be allocated on the basis of needs and only after some threshold level has been achieved can the remaining risks distributed in such a way that the total disvalue of these losses is minimized. An important advantage of this allocation framework is that it does not (...) require the aggregation of incommensurable values into one measure. (shrink)

We report the results of a vignette study with an online sample of the German adult population in which we analyze the interplay between need, equity, and accountability in third-party distribution decisions. We asked participants to divide firewood between two hypothetical persons who either differ in their need for heat or in their productivity in terms of their ability to chop wood. The study systematically varies the persons’ accountability for their neediness as well as for their productivity. We find that (...) participants distribute significantly fewer logs of wood to persons who are held accountable for their disadvantage. Independently of being held accountable or not, the needier person is partially compensated with a share of logs that exceeds her contribution, while the person who contributes less is given a share of logs smaller than her need share. Moreover, there is a domain effect in terms of participants being more sensitive to lower contributions than to greater need. (shrink)

We report the results of a vignette experiment with a quota sample of the German population in which we analyze the interplay between need, equity, and accountability in third-party distributive decisions. We asked subjects to divide firewood between two hypothetical persons who either differ in their need for heat or in their productivity in terms of their ability to chop wood. The experiment systematically varies the persons’ accountability for their neediness as well as for their productivity. We find that subjects (...) distribute significantly fewer logs of wood to persons who are held accountable for their disadvantage. Independently of being held accountable or not, the needier person is always compensated with a share of logs that exceeds her contribution, while the person who contributes less is punished in terms of receiving a share of logs smaller than her need share. Moreover, there is a domain effect in terms of subjects being more sensitive to lower contributions than to greater need. (shrink)