I was quite excited when I first read Restall and Russell’s (2010) paper. For two reasons. First, because the paper provides rigorous formulations and formal proofs of implication barrier the- ses, namely “theses [which] deny that one can derive sentences of one type from sentences of another”. Second (and primarily), because the paper proves a general theorem, the Barrier Con- struction Theorem, which unifies implication barrier theses concerning four topics: generality, necessity, time, and normativity. After thinking about the paper, I (...) am satisfied with its treatment of the first three topics, namely generality, necessity, and time. But I am not satisfied with its treatment of normativity, so my comments are exclusively on that topic. (shrink)

This paper presents an outline of a new theory of relevant deduction which arose from the purpose of solving paradoxes in various fields of analytic philosophy. In distinction to relevance logics, this approach does not replace classical logic by a new one, but distinguishes between relevance and validity. It is argued that irrelevant arguments are, although formally valid, nonsensical and even harmful in practical applications. The basic idea is this: a valid deduction is relevant iff no subformula of the conclusion (...) is replaceable on some of its occurrences by any other formula salva validitate of the deduction. The paper first motivates the approach by showing that four paradoxes seemingly very distant from each other have a common source. Then the exact definition of relevant deduction is given and its logical properties are investigated. An extension to relevance of premises is discussed. Finally the paper presents an overview of its applications in philosophy of science, ethics, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.

This article is concerned with the role empirical research can play in normative practical ethics. There is no doubt that ethical research requires some kind of collaboration between normative disciplines and empirical sciences. But many researchers hold that empirical science is only assigned a subordinate role, due to the doctrine that normative conclusions cannot be justified by descriptive premises. Scientists working in the field of ethics commonly hold, however, that the empirical sciences should play a much bigger role in ethical (...) research. The aim of this paper is to show that empirical sciences can play a substantive role in normative ethics, with no illicit inferences from is to ought. To achieve this aim, I explain Hume’s thesis. In the following sections, I am concerned with different uses of empirical data that do not imply an illicit inference from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. The article demonstrates that there are many modes of ethical reasoning that allow for a substantive use of empirical data, and it also shows the importance of Hume’s thesis for clarifying ethical reasoning. (shrink)