Integrity not only is a central concept within virtue ethics and a subject of considerable debate among philosophers regarding its nature and relation to other virtues, but also is important for our understanding of what it means to possess a constituted and coherent self. Much of the literature on integrity is focused on relationships among moral principles and virtues, while less attention is paid to any relationship that integrity might have to practical agency or personal identity. In maintaining this focus, (...) philosophers fail to appreciate the special relation integrity has to the constitution of a coherent self. Central to integrity are considerations about self-identity and agency because it is through ongoing and deliberate activities that reflect the type of person with which she wishes to identify that a person constitutes self-identity and agency in a coherent manner. Once the relationship between integrity and a coherent self is properly understood, it becomes clear that the moral content of integrity is relatively thin and that the approbation usually associated with a person of integrity stems not from judgments about convictions or principles, but from the relationship between actions and commitments. (shrink)

The idea that impartial moral theories – consequentialism and Kantian ethics in particular – were objectionably hostile to a person’s integrity was famously championed by Bernard Williams nearly 40 years ago. That Williams’‘integrity objection’ has significantly shaped subsequent moral theorizing is widely acknowledged. It is less widely appreciated how this objection has helped shape recent thinking about the nature and value of integrity itself. This paper offers a critical survey of main lines of response to this objection.

ABSTRACT: Among recent criticisms of impartial moral theories, especially in consequentialist and deontological forms, Bernard Williams’ integrity objection is perhaps the most tantalizing. This objection is a complaint—at once both general and deep—that impartial moral theories are systematically incapable of finding room for integrity in human life and character. Kantians have made forceful responses to this integrity objection and have moved on. Consequentialists have found the objection more trying. I offer reasons to think that consequentialists too can safely move on. (...) These reasons suggest the relationship between integrity and impartiality is less antagonistic than often supposed.RÉSUMÉ : Parmi les récentes critiques des théories morales impartiales, notamment les critiques conséquentialiste et déontologique, l’objection d’intégrité de Bernard Williams est possiblement la plus attrayante. Cette objection—à la fois générale et profonde—reproche aux théories morales impartiales d’être incapables de retrouver l’intégrité dans la vie et le caractère humains. Les kantiens ont répondu vigoureusement à cette objection, puis sont passés à autre chose. Les conséquentialistes ont trouvé l’objection plus éprouvante. Je soutiens que les conséquentialistes peuvent, eux aussi, passer à autre chose, en suggérant que le rapport entre l’intégrité et l’impartialité est moins antagonique que supposé. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Abstract 1 This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams? seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at avoiding Williams? (...) challenge fail and that others are likely to remain unpersuasive. The paper concludes by offering an argument to the best explanation: Williams? important insight is best explained by the supposition that integrity is an epistemic virtue, and an epistemic virtue of a practical sort. (shrink)

Despite the fact that most of us value integrity, and despite the fact that we readily understand one another when we talk and argue about it, integrity remains elusive to understand. Considerable scholarly attention has left troubling disagreement on fundamental issues: Is integrity in fact a virtue? If it is, what is it a virtue of? Why exactly should we value integrity? What is the appropriate way to have concern for one’s own integrity? Is having integrity compatible with having significant (...) moral flaws? After an overview of common ‘data points’ or platitudes concerning integrity, this article outlines six distinct views of integrity that have been defended and draws attention to problems each has accommodating these data points. (shrink)