In this paper I shall examine the interrelationships holding between four of the main theses of Quine's philosophy. (1)Ho1ism (2)Underdetennination of scientific theories (3) Indeterminacy of translation (4) Ontological Relativity -/- These four doctrines have generated a lasting controversy: in one interpretation they seem to be false and in the other they are threatened to collapse into triviality. Moreover it has been claimed that they cannot be consistently upheld together. I shall argue, on the contrary, that they are true, original (...) and mutually consistent. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that Quine's principal argument for the Indeterminacy of Translation requires an untenably strong account of the underdetermination of theories by evidence, namely that that two theories may be compatible with all possible evidence for them and yet incompatible with each other. In this article, I argue that Quine's conclusion that translation is indeterminate can be based upon the weaker, uncontroversial conception of theoretical underdetermination, in conjunction with a weak reading of the ‘Gavagai’ argument which establishes the (...) underdetermination of the sense and reference of subsentential terms. If underdetermination is considered to be a widespread phenomenon in science, or in inductive reasoning more generally, then the Indeterminacy of Translation will be widespread too. Finally, I briefly consider two issues concerning the scope of this conclusion about the Indeterminacy of Translation: first, whether the argument presupposes behaviourism; and second, whether indeterminacy is restricted to the case of radical translation. I argue that the answer to both these questions is negative, and thus that the thesis of semantic indeterminacy remains relevant to those who disagree with Quine about some issues concerning the nature of mind and language. (shrink)