Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. (1 other version)Against Emotional Modularity.Ronald De Sousa - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):29-50.
    How many emotions are there? Should we accept as overwhelming the evidence in favour of regarding emotions as emanating from a relatively small number of modules evolved efficiently to serve us in common life situations? Or can emotions, like colour, be organized in a space of two, three, or more dimensions defining a vast number of discriminable emotions, arranged on a continuum, on the model of the colour cone?There is some evidence that certain emotions are specialized to facilitate certain response (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Fringe consciousness and the multifariousness of emotions.Ronald B. de Sousa - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
    Mangan draws his inspiration from James's account of fringe consciousness, but differs from James in focusing on something non-sensory, necessarily fuzzy, though not necessarily fleeting. A long tradition in philosophy has deemed non-sensory elements of consciousness to be indispensable to thought. But those, chiefly conceptual, forms of non-sensory fringe are not Mangan's focus. What then is Mangan talking about? This commentary envisages a number of possible answers, and tentatively concludes that fringe consciousness is essentially emotional. Emotional consciousness involves proprioception, however, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations