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  1. Renouvier and the method of hypothesis.Warren Schmaus - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):132-148.
    Renouvier was among the first philosophers in France to break with the nineteenth-century inductivist tradition and defend the use of hypotheses in science. Earlier in the century, the humanistically-educated eclectic spiritualist philosophers who dominated French academic life had followed Reid in proscribing the use of hypotheses. Renouvier, who was educated in the sciences, took up the Comtean positivist alternative and developed it further. He began by defending hypotheses that anticipate laws governing the phenomena, but then eventually adopted a more liberal (...)
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  • Formalist and Relationalist Theory in Social Network Analysis.Emily Erikson - 2013 - Sociological Theory 31 (3):219-242.
    Social network research is widely considered atheoretical. In contrast, in this article I argue that network analysis often mixes two distinct theoretical frameworks, creating a logically inconsistent foundation. Relationalism rejects essentialism and a priori categories and insists upon the intersubjectivity of experience and meaning as well as the importance of the content of interactions and their historical setting. Formalism is based on a structuralist interpretation of the theoretical works of Georg Simmel. Simmel laid out a neo-Kantian program of identifying a (...)
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  • Kant-Bibliographie 2003.Margit Ruffing - 2005 - Kant Studien 96 (4):468-501.
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  • When the Content to Be Taught Is a Norm: Canguilhem-Inspired Contributions to Educational Practices.Xavier Roth - 2018 - Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science 4:64-77.
    It has become customary since Foucault to present Canguilhem as a man whose work is voluntarily restricted to a particular domain of the history of science. Yet the current edition of his Complete Works reveals that Canguilhem has never considered himself a true historian of science. If he traced “the history of the formation, deformation and rectification of scientific concepts”, it is above all to nurture his profession of professor of philosophy with “unknown material”. On the assumption that Canguilhem subordinates (...)
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