This contribution examines the scientific background of Latino sine Flexione (LSF), an international auxiliary language constructed by Peano. LSF is part of a larger linguistic movement resulting from new technologies that accelerated globalisation. Science is a major driving force behind the international auxiliary language movement, both for creating an increased need for international contacts and for lending its data and methods to language construction. With LSF, Peano attempted to realize part of Leibniz’s dream of a universal language, of which a (...) temporary simplified form of Latin would become the first step. LSF was designed following Leibniz’s fragments compiled by Couturat. By eliminating conventional features from standard Latin, Peano attempted to reduce it to its logical expression. Inspired by the same concerns that motivated the symbolism of Formulario, he aimed for a simple language that owed its fit for international use to its being stripped down to the logical core shared by all languages. To achieve this, Peano proceeded by eliminating inflections from all words and establishing an “algebra of grammar” that governed the rules of word-formation. Simplicity, non-redundancy and computability are key values of LSF inspired from Peano’s mathematical practice. (shrink)

After the publication of Begriffsschrift, a conflict erupted between Frege and Schröder regarding their respective logical systems which emerged around the Leibnizian notions of lingua characterica and calculus ratiocinator. Both of them claimed their own logic to be a better realisation of Leibniz’s ideal language and considered the rival system a mere calculus ratiocinator. Inspired by this polemic, van Heijenoort (1967b) distinguished two conceptions of logic—logic as language and logic as calculus—and presented them as opposing views, but did not explain (...) Frege’s and Schröder’s conceptions of the fulfilment of Leibniz’s scientific ideal. -/- In this paper I explain the reasons for Frege’s and Schröder’s mutual accusations of having created a mere calculus ratiocinator. On the one hand, Schröder’s construction of the algebra of relatives fits with a project for the reduction of any mathematical concept to the notion of relative. From this stance I argue that he deemed the formal system of Begriffsschrift incapable of such a reduction. On the other hand, first I argue that Frege took Boolean logic to be an abstract logical theory inadequate for the rendering of specific content; then I claim that the language of Begriffsschrift did not constitute a complete lingua characterica by itself, more being seen by Frege as a tool that could be applied to scientific disciplines. Accordingly, I argue that Frege’s project of constructing a lingua characterica was not tied to his later logicist programme. (shrink)