This essay joins the ongoing conversation comparing the thought of Bruno Latour to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology in particular and the phenomenological tradition in general. The article queries whether or not there is a metaphysics at work in Latour’s philosophy and, if so, whether this metaphysics would be at a sufficient distance from what Heidegger labelled as ontotheology, “grasping” and “comprehending” being and beings in its totality. The essay finds that at crucial stages Latour repeats features of ontotheological modes (...) of thinking that make for the fact that, despite all evidence to the contrary, Latour is not so distant from modern attempts that reveal beings as they truly are or even beings as they always will be. Throughout, we query what Latour’s account of scientific practice and its concomitant crossing of contingency and meaning can contribute to recent debates in phenomenology. (shrink)