This article reexamines Vico’s early critique of Cartesian reasoning and of how the Cartesian method, which comes from epistemology, creates problems for the sciences once embedded into their methodologies and given a foundational role. The focus will be on De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709), where Vico argues against generalizing the Cartesian method and overemphasizing clarity and distinctness in the search for truth. To this end, Vico’s relation to Cartesianism is first carefully contextualized. Then, Vico is presented as a hylomorphist (...) when it comes to how scientific disciplines and their instruments interrelate, something key for understanding why he questions the “instrumentalization” of the Cartesian method in the first place. Afterwards, Vico’s account of the impossibility of maximal scientific progress when the Cartesian method is prioritized across the sciences is presented, as probabilistic reasoning and the importance of the imagination and memory take centerstage. Lastly, the article looks at Vico’s opposition to the geometrical method’s role in physics and his defense of visual thinking in mathematics. The hope throughout is to advance a picture of the early Vico as being not only a neo- Baconian pragmatist, but a hypermodern ”meta-Cartesian” thinker concerned with humanity’s optimizing its creative potential in order to achieve scientific advances. (shrink)

This essay addresses Jacques Derrida’s theory of metaphor, as it has been handed to literary theory and continental philosophy. Our aim is to reassess the relationship between metaphor and metaphysics, using two distinct critical lenses. We will contrast Derrida’s influential position to an anachronistic author – Giambattista Vico (1668–1744). Vico initiated what is now (retrospectively) called the romantic theory of metaphor, but the details of his theory are missing from current discussions. For this reason, Vico’s view is given closer attention. (...) Two new concepts are introduced: mute metaphor and heroic metaphor. These terms help specify precisely how metaphor can be conceived as a process of consciousness rather than a grammatical rule or grammatical exception. Finally, it is suggested that Vico’s theory is preferable to Derrida’s. Vico’s vision of metaphorical language is more fruitful and less problematic than Derrida’s, both methodologically and terminologically. The romanticism espoused by Vico also suggests itself to new modes of contemporary research concerning the purpose and function of metaphor within language. (shrink)

Martin Luther King, Jr.’s anti-war speech, “Beyond Vietnam,” is a noteworthy example of deliberation by dissent from the margins. Attention is given to the formation of his moral argument from similitude, its foundation in metaphor and archetypal imagery, and how it shifted perspective to enable the introduction of alternative lines of argument. King’s argumentation, as it worked rhetorically toward making the war debatable, exhibited key features of deliberative dissent, including catachresis, contingency, perspective, and incommensurability.

This article deals with the question concerning the role played by the concept of sensus communis in the philosophy of Giambattista Vico and the interpretation of it provided by Hans-Georg Gadamer in the context of his project of a philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer’s rehabilitation of the concept of commonsense, derived from an early work of Vico entitled De nostri temporis studiorum ratione ratione, is functional to his criticism of the methodological model of knowledge that the humanities have borrowed from the natural (...) sciences, to which Gadamer opposes the rhetorical-linguistic experience that one can make in a real community. Comparing these two philosophers will lead me then to analyze the interpretations of Gadamer’s hermeneutical appropriation of Vico that various scholars have provided, mostly to criticize Gadamer by arguing that his treatment of Vico’s concept of commonsense eventually falls prey to some kind of relativism. This topic also implies a critical analysis of the two authors’ overall philosophies, in particular with regard to the difference between Vico’s project of developing a science of human history grounded on universal transcendental structures in his Scienza nuova and Gadamer’s concept of extra-methodical truth and experience that forms the basis of his philosophical hermeneutics in Wahrheit und Methode. (shrink)

The Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico developed a theoretical framework for the study of human sciences that exerted a strong influence on psychology and other human sciences. He backed the unity of the knowledge about human mind and culture, including history, linguistics, philosophy, philology, epistemology, psychology, and for the first time proposed a method for their study that he ambitiously called ‘new science’. The article presents an overview of Vico’s thought and discusses some of the main axioms of his theoretical system. (...) His critique of Cartesianism as the alternative epistemology he outlined is put forward as a thoughtful tool for reflection on contemporary psychological science. This retrospective look at Vico’s idea would finally provide useful insights for a programmatic view on cultural psychology. (shrink)