This essay takes issue with two possible stances in comparative and intercultural philosophy. First, there is the idea of ascertaining a method or conditions of possibility before engaging in intercultural comparison. This amounts to contemplating a form prior to any content. Second, there is the idea that a plurality of given philosophical traditions exist that do not have to be held together by a notion of what philosophy is. This is equivalent to asserting a diversity of content without giving it (...) a form. In both cases, the disunity of form and content subverts comprehension of universality. After problematizing both stances, I will seek to retrieve a notion of universality, drawing from Hegel’s insights into the peculiar character of philosophy. For Hegel, philosophy has the character of life, which does not allow for the isolation of form or content. Philosophy thus conceived does not apply any methods but is its own method. (shrink)

Given the significant transformations underway in academia, it is pertinent to ask whether the traditional notion of entering the profession in response to a calling is still relevant. This article draws together hitherto unconnected strands of German and Anglo-Saxon literature on callings, then analyzes biographical narratives of 40 social scientists in Germany and the United States. The comparative analysis of the timing, sources, and nature of the respondents’ decision to become academics finds that almost all exhibit a calling orientation. However, (...) their responses no longer correspond to the classical, passive notion; instead, callings in academia have become agentic. In the context of a wider societal trend to self-realization, academia has been transformed to an activity that people pursue because they want to rather than because destiny or an external force pushes them to make such a commitment. The recognition of the social nature of callings is underscored by the significance of professional mentors and family. The unexpected predominance of similarities in the cross-national comparison of calling orientation suggests that the internationalization of academic standards and procedures and the high level of competition for few positions in both contexts may outweigh the effects of culture and tradition. (shrink)

Scholarly discussion has treated the account of the state of nature which Locke presents in his Second Treatise as neither an hypothesis nor a description but rather as a fiction. John Dunn, for example, claims that it is a `theoretical analysis of the fundamental relations of right and duty which obtain between human beings, relations which are logically prior to the particular historical situations in which all actual human beings always in fact find themselves'. Here Dunn presents a misleading account (...) of Locke's argument, presumably, as the title of his paper suggests, in order to mount an argument of his own about the `political relevance' of Locke's work to a time when no one takes seriously the early modern idea of the state of nature. However, this article also has a more serious concern. I argue that the representation of the state of nature as a merely imaginary, `theoretical analysis' of social relations obscures the significance of the early modern idea of a state of nature, not only for the work of Locke and his near contemporaries, but also, more importantly, for the broader development of western social and political thought. The idea of an original condition of freedom and equality played a central role in Locke's argument, serving as a means both to undermine the view that humans were born into a natural condition of subjection to the rule of others and to justify European expropriation of land in the Americas. It also represented one end of a developmental continuum, running from the original, most primitive, condition of humanity through to the societies of contemporary western Europe, which was thought to encompass all sections of humanity. While the idea of an original asocial condition on which this continuum was based was later brought into question, a closely related developmental framework nevertheless informed later movements in history and the social sciences. After being abandoned in its original form, this category was finally revived in 20th-century political theory, this time precisely in the form that Dunn mistakenly ascribes to Locke. The article concludes by speculating on the relationship between these normative and empirical perspectives on the state of nature. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo tem por objetivo apontar uma relação entre a estética e a ética em Sartre, mostrando que a constituição ética do indivíduo não se distingue da sua constituição estética. Primeiramente, parte-se da crítica que Merle faz em seu artigo à psicanálise existencial e se evidencia como o encontro com a história e a postulação de uma teoria da personalização nas obras biográficas destituem tais críticas. Num segundo momento, legitimam-se as postulações anteriores, apontando-se como na obra Saint Genet Sartre (...) ratifica a constituição do gosto sobre a moral pelo processo de personalização. Por fim, será visto que toda ética tem um pressuposto transgressor, na medida em que o sujeito ético é também sujeito estético.: This article aims to point out a relation between aesthetics and ethics in Sartre, showing that the ethical constitution of the individual does not distinguish from his or her aesthetic constitution. First, we start from Merle’s criticism of existential psychoanalysis, and we show how such criticisms can be dismissed on the basis of the encounter with history and the postulation of a theory of personalization in biographical works. Second, we point out how Sartre, in his Saint Genet, ratifies the constitution of a taste regarding the moral by the process of personalization. Finally, we will see that all ethics have a transgressive presupposition insofar as the ethical subject is also an aesthetic subject. (shrink)