’Death’ and ’Furniture’ are emblems for two very common (predictable, even) objections to relativism. When relativists talk about the social construction of reality, truth, cognition, scientific knowledge, technical capacity, social structure and so on, their realist opponents sooner or later start hitting the furniture, invoking the Holocaust, talking about rocks, guns, killings, human misery, tables and chairs. The force of these objections is to introduce a bottom line, a bedrock of reality that places limits on what may be treated as (...) epistemologically constructed or deconstructible. There are two related kinds of moves: Furniture (tables, rocks, stones, etc. - the reality that cannot be denied) and Death (misery, genocide, poverty, power - the reality that should not be denied). Our aim is to show how these ’but surely not this’ gestures and arguments work, how they trade off each other, and how unconvincing they are, on examination, as refutations of relativism. (shrink)

The difference between an historian and a poet is not that one writes in prose and the other in verse—indeed the writings of Herodotus could be put into verse and yet would still be a kind of history … The real difference is this, that one tells what happened and the other what might happen. For this reason poetry is something more philosophical and serious than history, because poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts.

Review of: Sophia Roosth, Synthetic: How Life Got Made (University of Chicago Press, 2017); and Andrew S. Balmer, Katie Bulpin, and Susan Molyneux-Hodgson, Synthetic Biology: A Sociology of Changing Practices (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

Slovenian epistemology is characterised by an idiosyncratic canon, based on three fundamental authors: Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré, and Thomas Kuhn. What binds this canon together is the attitude that the history of science should be viewed as a history of radical breaks or revolutions in scientific thought. The drawback of such an anthology of authors is not only that it is outdated, but that, from the position of this canon, it is difficult to discern the problems stemming from the approach (...) to history of science it endorses. In order to highlight the blind spots of Slovenian epistemology, I examine a different interpretative trajectory of the notion of scientific revolution in the United Kingdom and the United States. The methodological program, which focuses on revolutionary breakthroughs in scientific ideas, is thus re-evaluated by considering its strategic role in the institutionalisation of the history of science as a discipline. The event that marked the translation of French epistemology into English history of science were the lectures of the delegates from the Soviet Union at the Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology in 1931. In post-war Anglo-American history of science, the concept of scientific revolution was adopted as a means of excluding Marxist studies of science – which had spread under the influence of the Soviet delegation – from the realm of acceptable discourse. I demonstrate how the Cold War historiography of science introduced a divide between the “internal” and “external” factors of scientific development, and their supposed synthesis in the work of Thomas Kuhn. Finally, I review the critiques that the sociology of scientific knowledge levelled at the story of the Scientific Revolution and point out the importance of these controversies for current epistemological research. (shrink)

This article sheds new light on Bruno Latour’s sociology of science and technology by looking at his early study of the French writer, philosopher and editor Charles Péguy (1873–1914). In the early 1970s, Latour engaged in a comparative study of Péguy’s Clio and the four gospels of the New Testament. His 1973 contribution to a Péguy colloquium (published in 1977) offers rich insights into his interest in questions of time, history, tradition and translation. Inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, (...) Latour reads Clio as spelling out and illustrating the following argument: ‘Repetition is a machine to produce differences with identity’. However, in contrast to Deleuze’s work (together with Félix Guattari) on the materiality of machines, or assemblages [agencements], Latour emphasizes the semiotic aspects of the repetition/difference process. As in Péguy, the main model for this process is the Roman Catholic tradition of religious events. The article argues that it is this reading of Péguy and Latour’s early interest in biblical exegesis that inspired much of Latour’s later work. In Laboratory Life (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) and The Pasteurization of France (1988) in particular, problems of exegesis and tradition provide important stimuli for the analysis of scientific texts. In this context, Latour gradually transforms the question of tradition into the problem of reference. In a first step, he shifts the event that is transmitted and translated from the temporal dimension (i.e. the past) to the spatial (i.e. from one part of the laboratory to another). It is only in a second step that Latour resituates scientific events in time. As facts they are ‘constructed’ but nevertheless ‘irreducible’. They result, according to Latour, from the tradition of the future. As a consequence, the Latourian approach to science distances itself from the materialism of Deleuze and other innovative theoreticians. (shrink)

Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar made use of Gaston Bachelard’s concept of phenomenotechnique in Laboratory Life. Stating that this use of a Bachelardian concept contrasts with the sharp criticism Latour made of Bachelard in his later work, I consider whether it belongs to an early Bachelardian stage of Latour’s study of science or whether Latour and Woolgar made, from the beginning, an original and anti-Bachelardian use of the concept of phenomenotechnique. I address this question by offering two symmetrical readings of (...) Laboratory Life: one reading adopts a Bachelardian perspective, in which Latour and Woolgar’s ethnological and sociological investigation appears as an empirical corroboration of Bachelard’s epistemological theses, whereas the other reading insists on the way in which Latour and Woolgar depart from Bachelard, as the sociological study of the way in which power relations shape scientific practice challenges the latter’s rationalist convictions. Although I contrast Bachelard’s epistemological use of the concept of phenomenotechnique with Latour and Woolgar’s sociological one, I wonder in the conclusion whether these approaches to science may be regarded as complements rather than antagonists and find in Pierre Bourdieu’s theses on the specificity of the scientific field resources to combine them. (shrink)

Este artículo ofrece una meta-lectura (una interpretación de distintas interpretaciones) de la identidad filosófica de Bruno Latour. Se centra la discusión en tres tipos de interpretaciones: críticas, defensas y auto-definiciones del autor. Más allá de la simpatía o el rechazo a su filosofía, se argumenta que las complejidades del pensador francés se resisten a ser categorizadas con etiquetas unívocas o ser diseccionadas analíticamente. Con base en la reformulación de la crítica propuesta por el autor, se sugiere la «hibridación antagónica» como (...) carta de navegación para comprender adecuadamente las redes y ensamblajes que compusieron a Bruno Latour en tanto filósofo. (shrink)

For the social theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, measurement, quantification and calculation were of particular social and political significance. Karl Marx, inCapital, based his critique of classical political economy on an analysis of the quantification of labour as a commodity. Max Weber, inEconomy and Society, emphasized the importance of rational calculation in the conduct of modern bureaucratic organizations. And in his major work,The Philosophy of Money, Georg Simmel highlighted what he called ‘the calculating character of modern (...) times'. (shrink)