Integrated Information Theory posits a new kind of information, which, given certain constraints, constitutes consciousness. Searle objects to IIT because its appeal to information relies on observer-relative features. This misses the point that IIT’s notion of integrated information is intrinsic, the opposite of observer-relative. Moreover, Searle overlooks the possibility that IIT could be embraced as an extension of his theory. While he insists that causal powers of the brain account for consciousness, he maintains that these causal powers aren’t tied to (...) protoplasmic material. Whatever these causal powers are, they don’t consist in mere information-processing or computation. IIT agrees, and also positively characterizes the relevant causal powers as those involved in generating integrated information. Examining the further commitments of each theory reveals that IIT renews a fundamentally ontological challenge to information-processing and computational theories of mind. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory posits a new kind of information, which, given certain constraints, constitutes consciousness. Searle objects to IIT because its appeal to information relies on observer-relative features. This misses the point that IIT’s notion of integrated information is intrinsic, the opposite of observer-relative. Moreover, Searle overlooks the possibility that IIT could be embraced as an extension of his theory. While he insists that causal powers of the brain account for consciousness, he maintains that these causal powers aren’t tied to (...) protoplasmic material. Whatever these causal powers are, they don’t consist in mere information-processing or computation. IIT agrees, and also positively characterizes the relevant causal powers as those involved in generating integrated information. Examining the further commitments of each theory reveals that IIT renews a fundamentally ontological challenge to information-processing and computational theories of mind. (shrink)

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, philosophers of various sorts, including Helmholtz, Avenarius, Husserl, Russell, Carnap, Neurath, and Heidegger, were united in promulgating a new, “scientific” philosophy. This article documents some of the varieties of scientific philosophy and argues that the history of scientific philosophy is crucial to the development of analytic philosophy and the division between analytic and continental philosophy. Scientific philosophy defined itself via criticisms of old-fashioned systematic metaphysics and, in the twentieth century, of Lebensphilosophie. It (...) offered a modernist vision of philosophy participating in a progressive, problem-solving, piecemeal, and collaborative scientific ethos. The article argues that the rise of scientific philosophy indicates a change of the conception of science as well as philosophy in the late nineteenth century and notes some tensions in the accounts of science offered by scientific philosophers. The article offers some preliminary lessons for the interpretation of logical empiricism and phenomenology as episodes within a larger history of scientific philosophy. (shrink)

There have been several important breakthroughs in the fields of philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and neuroscience in recent centuries. Despite their complexities and varying opinions in each field, the majority of these breakthroughs tend to view human consciousness as a concrete reality influenced by physiological, social, and environmental factors. This raises the question of why such a dominant perspective did not prevail throughout the history of philosophy and why there were inclinations to deny it. Additionally, why did great (...) philosophers throughout history reject the notion of embodied knowledge, which is a revolutionary approach in both philosophy and neuroscience and holds significant implications across diverse fields, from educational sciences to artificial intelligence? In this paper, we explore the reasons behind these questions. Firstly, we trace the origins of this perspective back to ancient Greek philosophers, including figures like Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. Next, we examine the reasons for the continuation of this line of thought among modern philosophers, including prominent figures like Descartes and Kant. Lastly, we delve into the approaches and attitudes of pioneering philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who diverged from the mainstream and emphasized the significance of the body in knowledge and consciousness. Understanding the historical neglect of embodiment in philosophy is essential to fully grasp the complexities of human consciousness. By incorporating insights from both historical and contemporary perspectives, we can gain a deeper understanding of the embodied nature of knowledge and its far-reaching impact on various philosophical, scientific, and practical domains. (shrink)