This article develops a detailed, empirically driven analysis of the nature of the transition costs incurred in becoming disabled. Our analysis of the complex nature of these costs supports the claim that it can be wrong to cause disability, even if disability is just one way of being different. We also argue that close attention to the nature of transition costs gives us reason to doubt that well-being, including transitory impacts on well-being, is the only thing that should determine the (...) wrongness of causing or removing disability. Non-welfare considerations also defeat the claim that it is always wrong to cause disability. The upshot of these conclusions is that closer attention to the nature of transition costs supports disabled people who strenuously contest the assumption that their well-being is lower than nondisabled people. It also suggests that, in addition, disabled people should contest their opponents’ narrow account of how we should make ethical decisions regarding causing or failing to prevent disability. (shrink)

If we were to write down all those things that we ordinarily categorise as disabilities, the resulting list might appear to be extremely heterogeneous. What do disabilities have in common? In this paper I defend the view that disabilities should be understood as particular kinds of inability. I show how we should formulate this view, and in the process defend the view from various objections. For example, I show how the view can allow that common kinds of inability are not (...) disabilities, can allow that minor kinds of inability are rightly not described as disabilities, and can allow that socially imposed inabilities need not be disabilities. In the second half of the paper, I show that this theory is superior to rival theories. I criticize the wellbeing theory of disability (Kahane and Savulescu 2009, Savulescu and Kahane 2011, Harris 2001) and conventionalist theories of disability (e.g. Barnes 2016). Finally, I show how the inability theory is consistent with the best versions of the social model of disability. (shrink)

Benjamin Bagley ('Properly Proleptic Blame', Ethics 127, July 2017) sets out a dilemma for addressed blame, that is, blame addressed to its targets as an implicit demand for recognition. The dilemma arises when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake. If they wouldn't, addressing them is futile, and blame's emotional engagement seems unwarranted. Bagley wants to resolve the dilemma in such (...) a way that addressed blame's distinctive elements of hostility and emotional engagement can be accounted for. I argue that Bagley's focus on the proleptic character of addressed blame helps to avoid the dilemma, but that Bagley has difficulties accounting for the element of hostility in addressed blame. I suggest that an alternative account of addressed blame makes better sense of Bagley's paradigm example, avoids Bagley's dilemma in the way Bagley's original solution does, because it preserves addressed blame's proleptic character, and can account for addressed blame's elements of emotional engagement and hostility. (shrink)

The Bad-Difference View of disability says, roughly, that disability makes one worse off. The Mere-Difference View of disability says, roughly, that it doesn’t. In recent work, Barnes – a MDV proponent – offers a detailed exposition of the MDV. No BDV proponent has done the same. While many thinkers make it clear that they endorse a BDV, they don’t carefully articulate their view. In this paper, I clarify the nature of the BDV. I argue that its best interpretation is probabilistic (...) and comparative: it is the view that a person is likely to be, all things considered, worse off with a disability than without. As such, Barnes – who criticises the version of the BDV that disability by itself, intrinsically or automatically makes a person worse off – misses an opportunity to attack the most plausible and relevant version of the BDV, and the best version remains unchallenged. (shrink)

This paper assesses how views of disability and enhancement can combine. It is hard to maintain that disabilities and enhancements are both undesirable. Disability-positive views can combine with support for or opposition to enhancement, but not with the view that enhanced traits reliably increase well-being. It is consistent to hold that disability is bad and enhancement good; the plausibility of this combination depends on whether it is better to have more options and fewer limitations. Understanding these combined positions makes it (...) easier to check for consistency by evaluating positions on disability and enhancement against each other. (shrink)

Riassunto: L’impianto cocleare è una neuroprotesi che consente un recupero parziale dell’udito nella persona sorda. Nonostante la sua generale efficacia nel contrastare alcuni dei problemi legati alla sordità, il suo utilizzo è stato fortemente osteggiato da quella parte della comunità sorda che vede nella sordità una forma di identità culturale e non una patologia. Questo articolo inquadra in una prospettiva neuroetica le preoccupazioni della comunità sorda – difficilmente comprensibili agli udenti – esaminando le analogie fra il rifiuto dell’IC e il (...) disagio che si osserva nella popolazione generale relativamente al Potenziamento Cognitivo. Nel PCog, individui sani insoddisfatti delle proprie prestazioni, o comunque desiderosi di migliorarle, ricorrono ad interventi artificiali per potenziare le proprie funzioni cognitive. L’analisi evidenzia come, nel rifiutare l’IC, la comunità sorda possa voler tutelare un insieme di valori non così diverso da quello che la comunità generale richiama spesso nelle sue preoccupazioni rispetto alla diffusione dei PCog. Parole chiave : Impianto cocleare; Potenziamento cognitivo; Sordità; Cultura sorda The cochlear implant as cognitive enhancement? A neuroethical perspective on some issues raised by the deaf community: The cochlear implant is a neuroprosthesis that allows for partial recovery of auditory function in individuals who are deaf. Despite its general efficacy, its use has been strongly opposed by a part of the deaf community that perceives deafness as a form of cultural identity, rather than a pathology. This article considers the concerns of the deaf community – which are often difficult for hearing people to understand – from a neuroethics perspective, proposing that such opposition to CI is analogous to the general population’s unease with regard to Cognitive Enhancement. CE allows healthy individuals who are unsatisfied with – or would like to improve – their performance to use artificial interventions that enhance cognitive functions. The analysis reveals that, when opposing CIs, the deaf community may be protecting a set of values similar to those that the general community often evokes when voicing concerns about CE diffusion. Keywords: Cochlear Implant; Cognitive Enhancement; Deafness; Deaf Culture. (shrink)