In Epicurean cosmology, material reconstitution, or palingenesis (παλιγγενεσία) is the necessary consequence of the infinity of time and the eternity of atoms. I examine Lucretius’ treatment of this phenomenon (DRN 3.843–864) and consider the extent to which his view enables us to develop an Epicurean response to the question: what makes a person at two different times one and the same person? I offer a reading of this passage in the light of modern accounts of persistence and identity, and what (...) Lucretius states in Books 3 and 4 about memory and the soul’s motions. Guided by the metaphysical implications of this analysis, I determine the type of relation which, according to Lucretius, holds between the mental and the physical. (shrink)

An overview of the ancient philosophers and their philosophical system (divided into the fields of logic, physics, and ethics) comprising the living, organic, enduring, and evolving body of interrelated ideas identifiable as the Stoic perspective.

Overview of Epicurean physics and epistemology, ending with a critical discussion of Cicero's report on Epicurean theology.

This paper aims to investigate the equivalent of Epicurus’ πρόληψις, the second criterion of the Epicurean Canonic (DL X 31 = fr. 35 Usener), in Lucretius’ De rerum natura (DRN). Taking stock of the several occurrences of the Latin terms notitia and notities in the six books of the poem, I show that Lucretius’ view about preconception remains faithful to Epicurus’ πρόληψις, and that the poet does not endorse a less empiricist position than his Master because of some influence of (...) the Stoic ἔννοια. To this end, I will also briefly address an important case in which πρόληψις, albeit not clearly mentioned, plays an essential role, namely the prolepsis of the deity (DRN V 1169–1182). Finally, I explain how Lucretius can be of some help in grasping the controversial relationship between the criterion of πρόληψις and that of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας (animi inectus/iactus), showing in which way the poet seems to consider the latter as a criterion of truth in its own right. (shrink)

Most ancient philosophers accept that dreams have prophetic powers enabling humans to relate somehow to a world beyond their own. The only philosophers known to make a clean and explicit break with that tradition are the Epicureans, beginning with Epicurus himself and reaching his last eminent follower, Diogenes of Oinoanda. They openly reject the idea that dreams mediate between the divine and the human realms, or between the world of the living and the world of the dead. They demystify the (...) phenomenon of dreaming by explaining sleeping and dreaming in terms of their materialistic physical theory. Importantly, they examine dreams and their content from different perspectives and explore their relevance to our lives. The general aim of this paper is to offer a synthetic account of the Epicurean view about dreaming and dreams, advance certain new hypotheses that seem worthy of consideration, and show how Epicurus and his followers integrate dream theory into their philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

I develop a positive interpretation of Democritus' theory of agency and responsibility, building on previous studies that have already gone far in demonstrating his innovativeness and importance to the history and philosophy of these concepts. The interpretation will be defended by a synthesis of several familiar ethical fragments and maxims presented in the framework of an ancient problem that, unlike the problem of free will and determinism, Democritus almost certainly did confront: the problem of the causes of human goodness and (...) success. I will argue that Democritus' account of the virtues and success is naturally interpreted as an intellectualist one. His focus on our intellectual powers as the source of our own agency and cause of our success led him to remarkable breakthroughs in moral psychology, including the development of a kind of cognitive-behavioral therapy for stress and anxiety, and the proposal of an autonomous source of moral sanction. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the ontology and epistemology of time in Lucretius’ De rerum natura. It uses the physiology of perception as well as epistemology to shed new light on the metaphysics. It presents an exegesis-based interpretation of the nature of time and of its perception, both arguing for and refining this interpretation by showing its explanatory power. The paper shows that Lucretius represents the perception of time or sensus temporis as a distinct sensory faculty, reconstructs how it emerges and operates, (...) and relates it to his account of perception more generally. The sense of time in turn is seen to explain aspects of related faculties, including thought and sight, and cases of apparent simultaneity. The paper thus contributes to, among other things, our understanding of the speed of perception and Lucretius’ account of the nature of time itself — arguing that Lucretius represents time as both continuous (not atomic) and real, as well as something perceived. (shrink)

El objetivo del trabajo consiste en relevar las funciones asignadas explícitamente por Epicuro a las distintas epítomes que se han conservado de su obra. Dicho relevamiento tendrá por objetivo, en primer lugar, señalar algunas dificultades implícitas en lo que denominaré la Interpretación Mínima, la cual se funda sobre tres presupuestos centrales: i) que el epicureísmo constituye una filosofía accesible a cualquier individuo, sin importar su género, estatus social, linaje o formación filosófica; ii) que, en concordancia con esto, las epítomes epicúreas (...) constituyen resúmenes de las doctrinas principales del epicureísmo que pueden ser leídas por cualquier individuo independientemente de su formación filosófica; iii) que el manejo de las epítomes es suficiente por sí mismo para garantizar el acceso a la eudaimonia. A continuación, analizaré una línea de interpretación alternativa ya sugerida parcialmente por algunos comentaristas, la cual enfatiza la existencia simultánea de dos modalidades de abordaje de las epítomes, para concluir señalando las dificultades inherentes a dicha línea de lectura. (shrink)

This text analyzes Diogenianus’ testimony (apud Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8) as a source for Chrysippus’ reply to an objection leveled against Stoic Fate-determinism. I argue that the objection addressed by Chrysippus in the testimony bears relation to the Idle Argument as reported by both Cicero and Origen but, unlike the Idle Argument, deals with the notions of “that which depends on us” (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς), “that which proceeds from us” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν), and the issue of accountability.

This paper reconstructs Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of Epicurean atomism, and explicates his claim that it represents a problematic idea, similar to the idea exemplified in early, “barbaric” accounts of the differential calculus. Deleuzian problematic ideas are characterized by a mechanism through whose activity the components of the idea become determinate in relating reciprocally to one another, rather than in being determined exclusively in relation to an extrinsic paradigm or framework. In Epicurean atomism, as Deleuze reads it, such a mechanism of (...) determination can be found in the famous atomic “swerve”. It is necessary to bear this interpretation of Epicurean atomism in mind when understanding Deleuze and Guattari’s promulgation of a new image of thought in What is Philosophy? , which has an explicitly Epicurean inspiration. The paper argues that this inspiration is particularly evident to the extent that Deleuze and Guattari identify the sub-representative feature that lies at the heart of their new image of thought with “chaos”, defined as “infinite speed”. I claim that infinite speed, this otherwise puzzling feature of What is Philosophy? , ought to be understood in the light of Deleuze’s interpretation of Epicurus. Moreover, the Epicurean distinctions between different speeds must be read together with Deleuze’s appropriation of the metaphysics of the ancient Stoics, who, although widely recognized as Deleuze’s Hellenistic counterparts, lack important theoretical resources that the Epicureans provide for Deleuze. (shrink)

In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura, Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a (...) criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself. (shrink)